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Abstract 
 
La partecipazione politica delle donne in Tunisia e Marocco dal 2011. 
Un’analisi comparativa. 
 [Tesi in inglese] 
 
Dipartimento di Scienze politiche, giuridiche e studi internazionali, Università 
degli studi di Padova. 
Anno accademico: 2016-2017 
Relatore: Paolo Graziano 
 
Lucille Delbecchi  
 
Politicamente, ci sono stati molti cambiamenti questi ultimi anni sulla sponda Sud 
del Mediterraneo. I popoli hanno rivendicato più libertà e più democrazia, e tra di 
loro le donne  hanno fatto particolarmente sentire la propria voce. L’obiettivo di 
questo lavoro è di analizzare le ragioni per cui la Tunisia e il Marocco, due paesi 
con storie e culture relativamente simili, non hanno reagito nello stesso modo. I 
dati per questo studio provengono da rapporti di organizzazioni internazionali, la 
stampa locale e internazionale, studiosi specialisti dell’area e di interviste con 
donne che vivono nella regione.  Anche se le due società sono abbastanza 
conservatrici, la Tunisia ha una lunga tradizione più favorevole alle donne, e un 
sistema educativo più efficace. In secondo luogo, il tipo di regime politico 
costituisce una delle ragioni per cui le donne marocchine hanno meno 
opportunità, perché la democrazia tunisina è più aperta alle novità. Però gli 
uomini in entrambi paesi tengono la grande maggioranza del potere politico 
formale. Infine, le donne trovano un terreno più accogliente per la loro 
partecipazione nelle organizzazioni della società civile, benché le loro azioni in 
Marocco siano più limitate. I due modi principali per migliorare la partecipazione 
politica delle donne è permettere a tutte di acquisire un’educazione, e ristabilire 
la fiducia tra i cittadini e le autorità politiche. 
  
 
 
Parole chiave: partecipazione politica; diritti della donna; Tunisia; Marocco; 
Maghreb; Primavera araba; società civile; sessismo; empowerment; 
femminismo; psefologia; elezioni; riforma costituzionale; LGBT 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Political participation in authoritarian or dictatorial countries was recently put in 
the spotlight when the events now known as “The Arab Spring” occurred. The 
expression “Arab Spring” refers to a wave of protests, uprisings and armed 
rebellions that spread across the Arab World in early 2011 (Manfreda, 2014). It 
started with non-conventional forms of political participation: the event that 
triggered the first mobilizations in Tunisia was a protest suicide against corruption 
and the rising prices of commodities. Immediately after Mohamed Bouazizi's 
death, Tunisia witnessed massive spontaneous public rallies of people who did 
not know each other and did not belong to the same social circles or 
organizations. 
 
The unrest spread with more or less success to a number of other countries in 
the region. Two countries with a similar background, Tunisia and Morocco, are 
interesting to compare. They have analogous colonization and decolonization 
experiences, an Arabic and French speaking, mostly Muslim population, and are 
located in the Maghreb. Economically, they rely heavily on tourism and have 
developing, rather weak industries. Their main difference is their demographic 
size: 33 million inhabitants for Morocco and 11 million for Tunisia. 
Their differences are a good way to understand the two society models they 
embody. The inhabitants of the Maghreb, in North Africa, form a distinct sub-
region where ideas, cultural events and phenomena circulate relatively fast. One 
country can serve as an inspiration for the other potential emulation between 
them. Modern communications (internet and cable TV) help the information get 
around. Social movements have tended to move across boundaries recently. The 
political participation of women in particular has to be analyzed. Since 2011, they 
have been at the forefront of the political upheavals, and several countries 
including Morocco and Tunisia have actually changed their laws and their 
constitution in order to better include this often-forgotten half of their population.  
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The proximity, besides the obvious geographical one, can be explained by 
reviewing briefly the countries’ history.  
 
1. Brief history  
A similar colonial history until 1956 
 Both Morocco and Tunisia used to be French protectorates: Tunisia signed the 
protectorate agreement in 1881 (Bardo Treaty) and Morocco in 1912 (Fès 
Treaty). They also became fully independent states at the same moment, in 
March 1956. France took the important decisions when it came to administering 
its protectorates, and organized them according to French rules and habits. In 
order to structure the countries’ administration and judicial system, many laws 
and regulations were passed in the decades of French domination. Some laws 
from that period remain nowadays (Mahfoudh & Delphy, 2014).  
It is the case, for instance, of a homophobic law in Tunisia, that was created and 
implemented during the French rule, and still has legal consequences to this day. 
The criminalization of homosexuality in Tunisia actually began with the passage 
of the 1913 Penal Code, imposed by the authorities during the French 
protectorate. It still exists in article 230 of the Penal Code (Khouili, 2017). After 
their respective independence, the countries chose different options when it 
comes to political organization. 
  
Different paths taken since their independence 
Constitutionally speaking, the regimes differ in their nature: Morocco remained a 
monarchy, with its king being given more power since independence. It has 
indeed been ruled by powerful monarchs since 1956: Mohammed V, Hassan II 
and Mohammed VI – although it now claims to be a constitutional monarchy. 
Tunisia, conversely, has been a republic since its independence, with its 
successive leaders being in theory elected democratically. Habib Bourguiba was 
the president from 1959 to 1987, and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali from 1987 to 2011: 
they each always got at least 90% of the votes when running for president. 
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Despite this constitutional difference, the two countries were similarly viewed by 
the rest of the world as stable regimes with strongmen in charge, until the early 
2000s (Marlowe, 1999; The New Arab, 2017).  
An element that Tunisian governments have been particularly proud of since the 
country’s independence is the emphasis on women’s rights. The country wanted 
to be seen as a trailblazer in the region when it passed the “Personal Status 
Code” in 1957. This code granted much more freedom to Tunisian women than 
to most of its regional counterparts. The focus on women’s rights was often 
presented to Western governments and international organizations as a proof of 
modernity. 
In Morocco, women’s right to participate freely and fully in the country’s political 
life can be traced to the Kingdom’s first constitution, promulgated in 1962. (MAP, 
2015) 
 
Liberalization since the 1990s 
Although a much wider kind of liberalization took place in Morocco in the late 
1990s, when Mohammed VI succeeded his father, Hassan II already started 
relaxing the way his country was run at the beginning of the 1990s. In part due to 
Western pressure, he freed more than 800 political prisoners. He also allowed a 
constitutional referendum in 1995, which created a two-chamber parliament 
(Marlowe, 1999). Mohammed VI succeeded his father Hassan II as King of 
Morocco and Commander of the faithful in 1999. He immediately promised to 
liberalize the regime, notably by allowing more newspapers to be freely 
published, and by freeing a few political prisoners (Vermeren, 2009). 
 
In Tunisia, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali wanted to be seen as the reformer and 
modernizer of his country. During the 1990s, he reformed the Personal Status 
Code so it would better protect women and give them a few more rights (e.g. 
transmitting their citizenship to their children). 
 
Despite these stated liberalization efforts in the two countries, active social 
movements, protesting the way society was run, have appeared in the last ten 
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years. Protests have erupted with Gafsa in Morocco and voices have started 
emerging in peripheral Tunisia, notably to protest poverty and the lack of jobs. 
The Arab Spring, stemming from these demands, started in December 2010 in 
Tunisia. According to observers, Morocco is not considered as having gone 
through a revolution, even though the movement in the region did boost change 
in the country (Guidère, 2012). 
 
2. Focus in the media and in the scientific literature on the role 
of women in the Arab Spring 
Women’s participation in the Arab spring was particularly highlighted by the 
media and by the scientific literature (see Annex 1). One of the reasons for the 
interest might be that women became more visible than usual through their 
political participation: they wrote blogs, organized and participated in protests, 
created NGOs. Numerous reports were made centering on women’s activism, 
with some bloggers like Lina Ben Mhenni becoming internationally famous. 
Although the events are quite recent (this work being written in 2017), many 
academic articles and books have been written solely about women’s 
experiences and participation in the Arab Spring. This might be due to the fact 
that Arab women are not always very visible, and suffer from stereotypes: people 
would expect them to stay at home, and be submissive. The contradiction with 
the facts probably intrigued a lot of westerners.  
3. What political participation means 
When researchers and journalists speak about political participation, what do 
they mean? Political participation, according to Hague and Harrop (2013), “refers 
to any of the many ways in which people seek to influence the composition or 
policies of their government”. The ways people can participate in the political life 
of their country (or even of the world) are very varied, and can be categorized into 
two main forms: conventional and unconventional. The conventional participation 
generally includes voting through an official electoral system, campaigning and 
reaching out to potential voters (Verba 1978). The unconventional one however 
would be mostly non-electoral: a potential refusal to vote, boycotting, blogging, 
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or protesting for instance. The more or less organized results produced by 
unconventional participation consist mainly in interest groups and social 
movements. 
Hague and Harrop note that while it is not self-evident that the more participation, 
the better (a relatively apathetic population can be content and choose not to 
participate), conversely it usually indicates a lack of trust in the institutions and in 
politicians. It seems to have been the case in Morocco and Tunisia, at least until 
recently. 
 
One of the way to analyze political participation is to identify political resources 
and political interests, or motivations. 
Studies around the world have shown that it is very common for women to get 
involved primarily to fight for their rights (UN Women, 2012). However, a 
distinction must be done between women’s political participation and the fight for 
women’s rights. Women’s political participation can be borne through the need to 
obtain more rights, and can be hindered by a lack of rights, but women involved 
in politics do not necessarily structure their politics around women’s rights. 
During the course of my research, I interviewed two Tunisian women and a 
Moroccan woman, who helped me understand what the situation was like in their 
country. I will use what they told me as a primary source and examples of specific 
situations. 
A key concept when talking about women’s political participation is women’s 
empowerment. According to the United Nations, it has five components: 
“women's sense of self-worth; their right to have and to determine choices; their 
right to have access to opportunities and resources; their right to have the power 
to control their own lives, both within and outside the home; and their ability to 
influence the direction of social change to create a more just social and economic 
order, nationally and internationally”. (United nations population information 
network – POPIN, 2017) 
 
In two similarly conservative countries, where Islam still holds an important role, 
it is interesting to analyze what made Tunisia be ahead of Morocco in terms of 
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women’s political participation, and even more since 2011. What makes Tunisian 
women seem to have more agency than their Moroccan counterparts? Can it be 
solely attributed to legal and institutional differences? To what extent have regime 
types influenced women’s political participation in Tunisia and Morocco since 
2011?   
 
Part of the explanation of the difference between women’s participation could be 
found in cultural reasons. This participation caught the attention of observers 
because the role women played often contrasted with traditional expectations 
from their society, their culture. Rising levels of education (for women, but also 
men) and urbanization might explain it.  
 
There have been tangible constitutional and legal changes in both countries 
when it comes to women, their rights and their participation in politics since 2011, 
so it is interesting to explore why these changes came to be and to what extent 
they have been implemented.  
 
Women have found new ways to get involved outside the institutional realm. The 
influence of civil society is growing, but the two countries have utterly different 
ways of managing citizens’ organizations and listening to their demands.  
 
Since one of the main objectives of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (and 
before that, the Millennium Development Goals) is to achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and girls, especially in developing countries, it is essential to 
investigate what factors are at play when and whether women participate 
politically. That in turn could help determine what kind of efforts countries could 
make in order to achieve this empowerment goal. 
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CHAPTER I: TWO SOCIETIES WITH 
CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS WOMEN  
 
In both Morocco and Tunisia, women often have a hard time existing in the public 
sphere and in the public space. This is due to sexist reactions when it comes to 
women’s expressing themselves and their opinions, but also to social factors. 
1. Conservative societies not very sensitive to women’s rights 
Globally, it was only in the 20th century that women started to have equal rights 
compared to men. Across the world, in the business, political and personal fields, 
there still are inequalities to this day. Women are still considered “non-brothers” 
in a system that was conceived for “brothers”. Women are often depoliticized, 
and linked to their animal nature. Rousseau said that “The male is only a male at 
certain moments; the female all her life” (Emile, 1762). According to him and 
generations of male thinkers afterwards, women’s perceived animality sends 
them back to their inability to work in the political sphere (Sénac, 2017). This lack 
of consideration for women as actors in politics can be partially explained by their 
status in society, and the way they are treated. 
 
High prevalence of violence against women  
In international organizations, “the data and analysis of women’s political 
representation, women’s economic opportunities, and violence against women 
are treated separately”.(True 2012). However, the intersection of these three 
elements is essential to understand how and why women participate politically.  
In both Morocco and Tunisia, violence against women is quite widespread, which 
in turn has a huge impact on their political participation. Someone who feels 
threatened when walking on the street, or who cannot choose the way she 
dresses because it could threaten her safety, is not likely to feel like a full citizen 
in own country. (LET, 2015) 
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Statistics on the matter are particularly telling: in Morocco, the Haut-Commissariat 
au Plan says that 40,6% of women who live in an urban environment have been 
victim at least once of an act of violence in the last year. (Ngomo, 2017). Violence 
is widespread both in the public and the family spheres. Young brides can be 
beaten or humiliated if their new husband suspects they are not virgins. (Kadiri, 
08/2017) 45,9% of Moroccan women think that a woman « should tolerate 
violence in order to keep the family united » (Promundo, UN Women). Recently, 
a young woman was sexually assaulted on a bus by four teenagers. The video of 
the attack went viral, but no one on the bus did anything to stop the assault. 
Feminist movements say it is a symbol of how women are treated in the Moroccan 
society. (Tel Quel, 21/08/2017) Two-thirds of sexual violence take place in the 
public sphere. According to sociologist Soumaya Naamane Guessous, there are 
historical reasons for this: until the 1960s, women were simply not allowed in the 
public sphere. In people’s minds, a woman on the street is “a potential prey”. 
People who lodge a complaint after having been harassed or raped are not 
always taken seriously, or hear guilt-inducing comments, attackers are often 
protected by their community. (Hadni, 2017) 
The Moroccan watchdog on violence against women has denounced the lack of 
laws and measures to tackle the issue: marital rape still is not illegal, and the 
penal codes punishes adultery and out-of-wedlock intercourse (article 491 and 
490). (Tabet, 2015) A new bill to fight sexual harassment is said to in the works. 
This means that women have very limited agency or bodily autonomy, cannot 
express themselves freely and are limited in where they can live, who they can 
date. 
 
The situation in Tunisia is quite similar. Historically, society has been violent 
because of decades of state violence during the dictatorship. It was even more 
the case for women, because in addition to being tortured brutally, like men, they 
were also raped and sexually assaulted. They suffered from the social stigma 
attached to victims of sexual violence, as if they had become impure. The abused 
was directed both at women who had not been politically active, but happened to 
be married or related to activists, and at female activists. (Gall, 2014). According 
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to activist Sihem Bensedrine, there was a paradox between the regime being 
openly in favor of human rights, and its actions that massively violated women’s 
rights. Furthermore, “many of the victims came from deeply religious Islamist 
families and so were particularly sensitive to the sexual nature of much of the 
abuse”.  
After the revolution, parliamentarians have taken the matter in their own hands, 
and a new, comprehensive law fighting violence against women was passed in 
July 2017. It removes the possibility of making minors marry their rapist, and 
include compensation and support for the victims (El Feki, 2017). Now, the issue 
is whether the law will be implemented and will deter attackers. 
The LGBT community is particularly targeted by violent attackers (Lacroix, 2016) 
Lesbians in particular suffer from a double oppression, because of their sexual 
orientation and gender.  
Homophobia comes from the political system, among others. The Moroccan 
penal code (just like the Tunisian one) criminalizes homosexuality, in its article 
489. Offenders can get sent to up in three years in prison and have to pay a 1200 
dirham fine. 
Moroccan activist Abdellah Taia argues that since the law treats homosexual 
citizens as criminals, it allows the other citizens to brutalize them. When the 
people in power refuse to publicly condemns lynching and attacks, the general 
public could interpret it as an encouragement to continue (Kadiri, 2017). Following 
this reasoning, the social reaction is linked to the political one. This has led to a 
situation where victims who complain actually spend more time in prison than 
their attackers. In 2016 for instance, one of the victims had to spend four months 
in jail, while his attackers only received a two-month suspended sentence. 
According to Moroccan NGO Aswat, this puts LGBT people in a vulnerable 
position, since they cannot ask the state for protection in case of attacks.  
The situation is similar in Tunisia, where article 230 of the Penal Code prohibits 
female and male homosexuality. According to activist Senda Benjebara (2017), 
the situation is even more problematic for transgender people. They cannot 
change their gender, have no legal access to hormones. “A lot trans women often 
find themselves becoming sex workers. They are constantly beaten, arrested all 
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the time, mainly for prostitution.” For transgender men there also are problems, 
but not to the same extent. In such a conservative society, gender roles have to 
be respected.  
Given this violence against the LGBT community, when people, and women in 
particular, do not dare going to public places and expressing themselves, their 
agency is severely limited. Since their very way of living is illegal, there cannot be 
full political participation from them. 
 
Public opinion that encourages women to follow tradition 
 
Large parts of the public opinion (including women) have conservative, guilt-
inducing attitudes towards women. In Morocco, while 89% of women think that 
women should have the right to work just like their husbands, only 55% of men 
agree. Both genders agree that between men and women, if there are few job 
opportunities, men should have the priority. Only 5% of men support equal 
inheritance between sons and daughter. This issue of equal inheritance also 
exists in Tunisia, where the law, based on the Quran, does not assure women 
get equal inheritance to their brother. (Tanmia, 2017) 
 
And yet, it’s not just men who support the patriarchy. Women in a regional survey  
of the Arab world were just as, if not more, conservative on some of these points. 
For example, “nearly half or more of women in Egypt, Morocco and Palestine 
thought that a rape victim should marry her assailant”. (El Feki, 2017)  
Journalist Safa Belghith agrees that women also hold sexist views. “Some women 
I’ve spoken to are more passionate than men about those two issues and keeping 
the status quo. And also, these women are those who will raise men, at least in 
Tunisia, and actually in many places. The women will raise the men with certain 
ideas, and the men will reproduce what they’ve been told. It’s a circle” (Belghith, 
2017) 
However, when when it comes to the political world, the situation is more 
nuanced: 61% of men and 91% of women think that there should be more women 
in positions of political responsibility. (Tanmia, 2017) 
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An example of how women, and especially girls, are not treated as full citizens is 
visible in the continued existence of “maids”, or “petites bonnes”. In both 
countries, young girls as young as 6 or 7 are employed by wealthy families, to 
clean, cook and shop. Generally from a poor background, they send their wages 
to their families and are denied an education. According to a 2010 study, 
commissioned by the Collectif pour l’éradication du travail des « petites bonnes 
», between 60 000 and 80 000 Moroccan girls below the age of 15 were exploited 
in private homes across the country. These girls are paid below the minimum 
wage and learn no professional or educational skills. Even though the Moroccan 
government has vowed to act in 2016 and 2017, the situation of these minors is 
dire, and widely accepted by society: for poor parents it is a way of earning a little 
money, for wealthy families it is a way of paying little and having docile employees 
(Khadiri, 2017). In Tunisia, where the phenomenon also exists, a law was passed 
in 2016 to prevent human trafficking. Controls are hard to implement and it is not 
certain that the situation will change rapidly, since having young maids is a widely 
accepted practice in that society. (Bobin, 2017) 
 
Public relations to gain the trust of western governments and businesses 
While the governments in both countries publicly support women’s rights, and 
parliaments have recently passed laws protecting them, it seems that at least part 
of the women-right supporting discourse is crafted to facilitate the relationship 
with Western powers. According to Tunisian activist Nadia Chaabane, “every 
institution uses and manipulates the “Arab Women” issue, and publicizes it in 
international media” (2017). In both countries, the state promoted what has been 
called “state feminism” or “institutional feminism”. The state preempted the topic 
of women’s empowerment and created its own institutions (the Union nationale 
des femmes marocaines for instance), which was used an excuse to prevent 
activists from civil society from demanding too much, and helped support the 
countries’ institutional brand (Garcia Diaz, Belhdid). 
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Campaigners and activists are cautious when new bills and initiatives are 
launched. Governments use them for several purposes: reassure left-wingers in 
their own country, show foreign governments that in fact they are active on the 
human rights issue, and last but not least, differentiate themselves from Islamist 
governments, for which women’s rights are seldom a priority. (El Feki, 2017) 
 
As a matter of fact, Morocco has an entire public relations strategy to dedicated 
to designing the image of an open, progressive country (Vermeren, 2017). The 
monarchy works in cooperation with French communication agencies, in order to 
attract tourists and foreign investment. Even though the country is not very 
progressive when it comes to women’s rights or fighting violence against women, 
having tourists feel safe is a priority (Brahimi, 2017). 
 
 
2. The systems are not favorable to women’s empowerment 
The media and men in power perpetuate gender stereotypes 
International studies have shown that women in Moroccan and Tunisian media 
(press and TV) are much less present than their male counterparts. That was true 
both when accounting for women interviewed as eye witnesses, experts and 
journalists. 
 
 People in the news Overall reporters 
Female Male Female Male 
Morocco 20% 80% 37% 63% 
Tunisia 19% 81% 61% 39% 
Table 1: People in the news and reporters, by sex, Global Media Monitoring Project, 
2015 
This table, put together by the Global Media Monitoring Project, shows that 
except for the proportion of TV and radio female reporters in Tunisia, women are 
always vastly underrepresented in Moroccan and Tunisian media.  
 
According to left-wing Tunisian politician Jouneidi Abdeljawad, media are partly 
to blame for the deficit in women’s political participation. “Given the fact that 
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politicians usually become famous thanks to media exposure, the media play an 
important role in promoting (or not) women”. Party leaders often decide who to 
put at the top of ballot lists based on popularity and name recognition. 
(Boukhayatia, 2016) 
Even though women have become more active in society, and are better 
represented in parliament, the media narrative around them has not kept up and 
still privileges traditional gender roles. Women’s contributions to society are not 
always recognized or valued (Moghadam 2003). 
This contributes to reinforcing gender stereotypes in public opinions, as female 
leadership is not seen as reliable or serious. Rationality, competence, and 
leadership, skills that are indispensable in order to run for office, are still shown 
as a natural masculine trait (Haweksworth 2005). Researcher Loubna Skalli 
investigated how the press reported on women in the 2009 local elections in 
Morocco. She analyzed 1,738 news items and discovered that women were 
present in less than one percent of all articles. This proportion, and the way 
women-related topic were written, “undermines the credibility of women as 
political agents”. 
 
Men in power are also responsible for supporting gender stereotypes not 
favorable to women’s empowerment and thus political participation. 
Whatever lifestyle women choose, powerful men often find fault with. 
Conservative men openly disavow progressive and liberal women. Other men 
who call themselves modern discriminate against women because they wear a 
hijab. Journalist Safa Belghith recalls how she was discriminated against by a 
university professor. “This professor really hated the hijab for some reason. He 
said, “you know, even if you succeed in the written exam, you will be failed at the 
oral exam. I am on the jury, and I will make sure that you don’t pass. Because 
you don’t represent Tunisian women.” Which is absurd, because so many of us 
wear hijabs now, but he wanted to make a division between women. They play 
on these divisions”. He said that between two equal candidates, he would favor 
the one who didn’t wear a hijab, because he knew she shared his ideological 
beliefs (2017). Often, the men currently in power, running administrations were 
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already there under the previous regime. It had a strict policy of discriminating 
against hijab-wearing women, and treating them as submissive and lacking 
agency. The persistence of these stereotypes among people who can hire new 
recruits for the state and educate the new generation of elites can discourage 
women from religious backgrounds to participate politically to the life of their 
country. 
 
The education of girls is problematic but improving 
Education is indispensable to be able to participate politically: without it, people 
are unable to read and decipher political programs or read contrasting and critical 
opinions in the press. It is therefore more difficult to form their own opinion. 
Schools also educate young children to political citizenship through civic 
education, and teach them values necessary to understand their country’s 
political system (Quintelier, 2008).  
 
Tunisia had low literacy rates among its population until recently. In Morocco, it 
is still the case. In both countries, the situation is worse for women, particularly 
those over 65 years old.   
 
In Tunisia, women’s literacy rates how grown steadily since the 1980s, from 38% 
in 1985 to 72% in 2015. (See graphs below) Young women in particular are 
almost completely literate (95.8% for women aged between 15 and 24 in 2015), 
but only 24% of women over 65 are able to read, which represents 31 points less 
than men. At the university level, women represent 62% of all students. 
This can be seen as one of the explanations for the Arab Spring and the 
increasing political participation of women in the Tunisian society: with time, 
women are now more likely to understand political platforms, create their own, 
plan and organize events. They are more likely to have acquired skills useful for 
political participation, either through higher education or through a qualified job.  
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Figure 1: Tunisia, Literacy rate among the population aged 15 years and older, UNESCO, 2015 
 
 
Figure 2: Tunisia, Literacy rates according to age and gender in 2014, UNESCO, 2014 
 
 
Figure 3: Morocco, Literacy rate among the population aged 15 years and older, UNESCO, 2015 
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Figure 4: Morocco, Literacy rates according to age and gender in 2014, UNESCO, 2014 
 
In Morocco, numbers have also gone up, but still 40% of the female population 
was not able to read in 2012. Young women were the most literate, at 87.7% 
among those aged 15 to 24, which was 3 points below men the same age. When 
it comes to older women (65+), the situation is completely different: 17.6% are 
literate, 32 point behind men from the same generation. At the university level, 
although women represent 48% of all university students, they represent less 
than 20% of doctoral students. (Ministry of Education, 2017) 
Morocco’s rural female illiteracy rate is 41.9 percent (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 
2014). It has a particular impact on the Amazigh minority, since most Amazigh 
women live in rural, remote areas of the country. 
The lower rates of literacy in the Moroccan population and particularly among 
women can partly explain why women are not more active politically. 
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The status quo favors men over women in social and economic situations  
 
Figure 5: Women's discrimination index in family law, Le Monde Diplomatique, 2015 
Muslim-majority countries often base at least part of their family laws on principles 
taken from the Quran. As a result, women are often discriminated against in terms 
of family matters, notably in the field of inheritance (Sergie, Johnson, 2014).  
As shown in the map above, women are very disadvantaged in Morocco when it 
comes to family law, while Tunisian women do slightly better.  
 
Morocco used to have a very conservative Personal Status Code, because it was 
based on the old tribal order.(Mahfoudh & Delphy, 2014) 
 
In Morocco, based on Islamic principles, women inherit half the amount that their 
brothers get, and wives only get 1/8th of what their husband owned. Non-Muslim 
women cannot inherit from their Muslim husband, unless they convert to Islam. 
(Verdier, 2017). 
According to Asma Lamrabet, a leading Muslim feminist, reforming the 
inheritance laws is never a priority, because it is theologically and politically 
incorrect. Morocco’s constitution itself is ambiguous, since it poses equality as a 
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rule, but only to the extent that it takes into account the country’s traditions, 
notably Islam. As a consequence, Moroccan men own 82% of all land deeds in 
the country. (Verdier, 2017) 
 
In Tunisia, the recent suggestion by President Béji Caïd Essebsi to allow equal 
inheritance between men and women has sparked intense debate. Many citizens, 
especially those who identify as conservatives, have said that it should not even 
be a topic of discussion. Ennahdha MP Monia Ibrahim said she was shocked the 
president even suggested it, since it goes against very clear Islamic rules, that do 
not require interpretation. (Samoud, 2017) This shows that even women, who 
would vastly benefit from the measure, take into account other factors than their 
collective interest as women. In that case, religion is seen as more important. 
Reflecting on the current debate, Tunisian journalist Safa Belghith explains that 
the problem runs deep. “A lot of Tunisian women don’t receive an inheritance…at 
all”.  
 
Islam-based family law also favors men when it comes to getting divorced or 
getting custody of the children for instance. (Sergie, Johnson, 2014). 
An important element has to be kept in mind when reading about potential 
changes to the law: passing the laws and applying them are two different issues. 
The judges, the police and other officials in charge of enforcing them are often 
conservative themselves. (El Feki, 2017) 
 
In consequence, the status quo is maintained by local and national authorities, 
who allow men to keep their power: Jeanne Chiche (1992) talks about “a social 
order that is organized to keep its patrilineal basis”. Indeed, with much fewer 
inherited resources, and the threat of becoming a destitute if a male member of 
the family decides so, women have little stability in their finances. Starting a 
political career necessitates financial resources, that women are much less likely 
to have due to the laws and traditions in Morocco and Tunisia (UN Women). Even 
when it comes to participating politically in general, and not just running, women 
might be concerned about their resources: campaigning and protesting takes 
~ 22 ~ 
 
time, that is not worked. Since women own very little inherited wealth, they rely 
on their work for survival, and getting involved politically presents a risk for their 
livelihood. They are also less likely to have financial resources, since a lot of their 
work in unpaid, for instance when they take care of their children. 
 
3. Clear divide between urban and rural women  
 
In both countries, rural women experience particularly tough life conditions that 
prevent them from participating fully to political life. 
 
Morocco still has a large proportion of its population that lives in the countryside. 
There, the standards of living are usually much lower than in the cities, and not 
every village has running water or electricity yet. There are immense differences 
in the HDI between rural and urban territories. In 2014, the Moroccan government 
estimated that 89,5% of its population officially considered poor lived in rural 
areas. Besides not having financial resources, poor rural populations also have 
low levels of education compared to the rest of the country, and low access to 
health services. (Haut-Commissariat au Plan, 2016) 
 
The female rural population lives the toughest life: besides working in the fields 
all day, they also have to take care of their household the rest of the time 
(childcare, cooking, cleaning). While this double day is quite common in many 
other countries, and in Morocco’s cities, women in rural territories have very few 
things to help them, especially when a number of them do not have access to 
electricity (because their village is not connected or because their family cannot 
afford it). A lot of women can feel isolated from the modern, urban society, 
because if they are illiterate, they cannot read the street names for instance, 
which means that traveling alone is out of the question. Another major issue is 
controlling their fertility and learning hygiene: it is difficult to obtain information 
about these issues. (Dalle, 2007) Women from the Amazigh community often live 
in very poor conditions, because besides the issues regarding rural women, they 
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often only speak Tamazight, and no Arabic, which the language of government, 
that can distribute subsidies for instance. As education progresses in these areas, 
and with Tamazight being included in the national languages, this issue should 
progressively disappear. (Sabir, 2017) 
 
In Tunisia, development-wise, the south has long been forgotten by the different 
regimes including the current one, according to journalist Safa Belghith. As an 
example, all the presidents have been from the coast (from urbanized areas). IDH 
rates are much lower in interior regions, such as Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid or 
Kasserine, than in coastal regions. People living there have much lower access 
to potable water or to a telephone network than the rest of the population (Najeh, 
2015). When it comes to inheritance laws, the situation is even worse for women 
in rural areas. Men in fact own practically everything, and women are usually 
deprived of their (smaller) share. (Bessis, 2017) 
  
Regarding access to resources, for instance to LGBT support, women in rural 
areas have almost no options. According to Tunisian activist Senda Ben Jebara, 
homosexuality is still much less accepted in rural areas, because people 
absolutely do not know what it is, or when they do, they refuse to acknowledge 
the existence of homosexuals among them. It still takes a lot of time and 
groundwork to access people in those areas. Another element is the migration of 
LGBT people to urban areas.  
 
As previously explained, women in both countries have fewer resources than 
men, which limits their political participation. In the case of rural women, the lack 
of resources is even more marked. It makes it easier for them to participate, but 
also makes their issues less appealing to politicians. Voters with no resources, 
very little influence on how things are decided are not the demographic most 
targeted by politicians running for office. However, rural women are getting more 
and more involved politically, in order to defend their rights, thanks to civil society 
organizations – this will be explained in Chapter III. 
 
~ 24 ~ 
 
4. Social exclusion mainly affects women, which in turn leads to 
political exclusion 
 
 
 
Women are more often affected by social exclusion, due to the fact that “Nowhere 
in the world do women share equal social and economic rights with men or have 
the same access as men to productive resources” (True 2012). 
Women can be excluded from social and political life for various reasons.  
First, they are less likely to be active in the professional world. Indeed, they are 
often responsible for raising the children, especially when there are no schools 
for children under 6 years old. They are often not remunerated for their work, 
especially in the rural areas – for instance if a woman works for her husband, she 
will not always get a wage. The last reason for not being active in the professional 
world is how conservative society can be: a woman’s place is in the home, not 
interacting with stranger, on her own.  
 
Figure 6: Women's activity rates in 2013, Le Monde Diplomatique, 2015 
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Studies find that women are more likely to participate politically if they have high 
educational achievement and participate in the paid labor force. (Borovsky, Ben 
Yahia 2012) Tunisian women have higher rates of unemployment than men, and 
only 28% of the active population are women. Rural women, and conservative 
women in general, sometimes feel that they are being left out from the feminists’ 
fights. They do not necessarily need the same things than liberal women from 
wealthier backgrounds: being allowed to have an independent job can already be 
an important step for them. (Daoud, 2015) In Morocco, men and women’s 
unemployment are not that different (8.5% for the general population in August 
2016, and 9.9% for women). However, only a very small proportion of Moroccan 
women belong the official workforce: 27,3% according to official statistics. The 
exclusion from the workforce is correlated with the level of education. 93% of 
young women who only have a primary school diploma do not work, while only 
37% of those who went to university are in the same case (Haut-Commissariat 
au Plan, 2015) 
 
The states’ social policies have an important impact on women’s exclusion. It 
depends on how (and if) contraception is easily accessible, if young mothers can 
get maternity leave, or a spot at a daycare center. Since women usually perform 
unpaid labor, they do not get maternity leave, and since kindergartens are 
missing, daycare centers are not the governments’ priority.  Women’s mobility is 
limited, and they are not associated to the decision mechanisms (Garcia Diaz, 
Belhdid, 2017) 
 
Social and economic exclusion are important reasons for the start of the 
revolution in Tunisia: even when people had diplomas and were willing to work, 
they often could not find paid employment.  
Women who are excluded from the workforce and do not have an educational 
background can participate in informal political actions, such as protests, hunger 
strikes, or specific events. However, participation to formal politics is harder, since 
it requires the ability to read and to create networks with people from varied social 
background – not the kind that poor women are likely to meet while doing unpaid 
~ 26 ~ 
 
labor. Subordination in the private sphere produces conditions for marginalizing 
women as economic, social, and political actors (AHDR 2005). 
 
 
Among other factors for feeling excluded is an ethnic and linguistic dimension. In 
1961, Hassan II underlined the importance of Arabic, Islam and the Arab identity 
of Morocco in the constitution. The Amazigh (otherwise know as Berber) 
populations, who speak a different language and claim a different language, felt 
left out. Even in the school programs, Moroccan history is taught through ideology 
of Arabism, and leaves out the important role and place of Amazigh culture. 
(Dalle, 2007). Some activists are fighting to put an end to these women’s 
marginalization. “Those of us who grew up speaking Tamazight knew that unless 
we left behind our mother tongue and learnt a language which was so-called 
‘better’ than ours, Arabic, we would never be able to move into the higher 
positions in society.” (Hicks, 2016) 
 
When it comes to homosexuality, the Moroccan government pushes LGBTQ 
community members to lead clandestine lives. Indeed, they have limited access 
to the justice system (since they could end up being the ones condemned), to the 
health system, to education, to the job market. (Lacroix, 2016) In Tunisia, the 
situation is similar if slightly less harsh: homosexuals who get caught usually do 
not get the full jail sentence, as it is written in the penal code. (Speakman Cordall, 
2015). As a community that is usually excluded from public life, participating 
politically is usually not at the top of their priority – surviving comes first (Ben 
Jebara, 2017). 
 
~ 27 ~ 
 
CHAPTER II: LIMITED, BUT GROWING FORMAL 
REPRESENTATION  
Tunisia and Morocco have complex relationships with democracy. Until power 
changed hands from Hassan II to his son Mohammed VI in 1999, the elections 
were fixed, with political parties created by the monarchy, without local 
implementation or base. Even after a series of reform, the influence of the 
Makhzen (a kind of clientelist governance that is specific to Morocco) is 
particularly strong. (Dalle) In Tunisia, presidents until 2011 always got elected 
with over 90% of the votes, with no other candidates being credibly able to win. 
The Arab Spring and the demands for more freedom in the region had a direct 
impact on constitutions and electoral laws in the two countries, as well as 
increases in the number and proportion of women elected to office. 
 
1. A new approach to politics that inspired the population in both 
countries 
 
Tunisia was a precursor in the region when its population kept meeting for bigger 
and bigger protests at the beginning of 2011, to speak their anger to the 
government: it was considered corrupt, inefficient, and incapable of answering 
the citizens' needs. Another element that motivated the protesters was the feeling 
that the whole regime was illegitimate: the president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, had 
come into power thanks to a coup and had stayed there since 1987. He was then 
elected five times in a row with more than 90% of the votes, in non-democratic 
elections where opposition was almost non-existent. The protesters demanded a 
regime change, accompanied by more economic, social, political and religious 
freedom, as well as numerous reforms to improve their standards of living. 
This uprising and its outcome was seen as a model by a part of the population in 
Morocco, whose inhabitants identified with Tunisians (Mohsen-Finan, 2013). 
Morocco had also had the same leader for a very long time (King Mohamed VI) 
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and before him his father, and the steps towards democracy had slowed down in 
the previous years.  
 
This country and Morocco were actually part of a larger phenomenon: in almost 
every country where parties were newly free to run and the electorate could freely 
choose who to vote for, the Islamist parties won and arrived in power.  (Valter, 
2011) In Tunisia, the winning party was Ennahdha, whereas in Morocco it was 
the Justice and Development Party. Islamist parties had been banned for a long 
time and their members often persecuted by the government.  
 
Western democracies, often worried by Islamist political movements, and the 
consequence their accession to power could have in the region, didn't react to 
these crackdowns, or even supported them. Western powers had previously tried 
to support relatively secular movements, even when it meant supporting people 
not democratically elected. When people had finally the choice to decide what 
party would represent them, a lot of them (27% of the voters in Morocco, 37% in 
Tunisia, both in 2011) took a chance on these Islamist parties, that represented 
themselves as nationalist and unfairly treated for years. The fears of their 
detractors were apparently not that founded: when new elections occurred in 
2013 in Tunisia, less favorable to Ennahdha, the party left power pacifically; the 
Justice and Development Party in Morocco seems to be able to work with the rest 
of Parliament and to guarantee some stability to it. (Halimi, 2014) 
 
Even though there was a lot of attention given to women’s participation and 
actions when the revolution started in 2011, women had been active far long 
before then, but they were kept invisible, and not listened to (Mahfoudh, Delphy, 
2014). Being unsatisfied by the state’s actions, women started creating their own 
structures in Morocco in the 1990s. (Garcia Diaz, Belhdid) 
The 2011 revolution was a catalyzer for young women in particular, who realized 
that they could get involved to defend their beliefs. With the dictatorial regime 
gone in Tunisia, many women realized new doors had opened for them. This was 
facilitated by the fact that literacy and education has risen in the last years.  
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Senda Ben Jebara recalls that she “personally had no idea what politics were 
before 2011”. She was aware that was many things were going on underground, 
but not much more. She was enthusiastic about all the new possibilities. Political 
parties started appearing and multiplying. More than 100 political parties were 
created, with many people defending the one issue they cared about.  
 
“Right after the revolution”, Safa Belghith went to the headquarters of Ennahdha 
in her city. “Because growing up in a family like mine, you will be politically aware. 
Because my mum also wears the hijab, so it’s the same oppression. And my dad 
goes to prayer, and he would be arrested sometimes”. Indeed, for many women, 
getting politically involved was due to the enthusiasm surrounding the new 
freedoms. One of the wishes of young female activists was that hijabi-wearing 
women would not be discriminated against, which seemed like an attainable goal 
with the Islamist party, Ennahdha, now authorized.  
People would vote for revolutionary values such as dignity and freedom (Belghith, 
2017), hoping that a range of new, different possibilities would be available. 
 
Defending women’s rights is very politicized. Many parties use them as political 
tools. Safa Belghith was reinforced in her choice to be a member of Ennahdha, 
just after the revolution, when she saw that they promoted women’s participation.  
“This will sound ironic and contradictory, but from my time in Ennahdha, even 
though they came out against equal inheritance, and the marrying non-Muslims 
[for Muslim women] initiatives, when it comes to on the ground activism, 
Ennahdha really do care about putting women in leadership positions. I’ve never 
had a problem, I was there for a year and a half, and I was actually really 
encouraged: as a young person, and as a woman, to take responsibility, and 
leadership”  
 
.  
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2. After 2011, constitutional and legal changes took place in 
favor of women 
The role of women in a given society is often used as a way to measure its political 
maturity and its proximity (or not) to an ideal liberal democracy (Hague and 
Harrop, 2013). Women have been able to vote since 1957 in Tunisia and 1963 in 
Morocco, which does not mean that they share equal rights with their male 
counterparts. In 2013, a Tunisian project aiming at reforming the constitution 
referred to women as complementary to men, rather than as their equal. Feminist 
organizations and large parts of society had to fight politically and more generally 
in the public sphere to avoid that regression. Even though little has changed in 
the last few years for Tunisian women, they can now express themselves and 
participate in the political life of the country, something that was reserved for very 
few women, chosen by the government, until 2011 (Beaugé, 2015). The hurdles 
to women’s political participation are not only set up or maintained by the political 
world, they are also due to the strong influence of religion and tradition – in both 
countries, but mainly so in Morocco (Radio Orient, 2016). However, Moroccan 
feminist organizations are becoming more vocal in their requests, and on an 
institutional point of view, the number of women elected in Parliament keeps 
growing (2 in 1993, 60 in 2011). 
 
In Tunisia, a revolution happened, supported by a grassroots movement. In 
Morocco, the process was much more gradual: the country opened itself to more 
democratic practices and participation of the people but didn't change radically. 
The effect it had is strikingly different: Tunisia has had several governments of 
different persuasions in five years, new protests, unexpected murders and 
electoral results. For now, it can be considered as having not yet reached 
complete stability. On the contrary, Morocco is considered as one of the most 
stable countries in the region, with its king still in power, as well as the party that 
won the 2016 legislative elections.  
There is a gap between a mainly non-democratic monarchy and a formerly 
dictatorial republic transitioning to democracy: Tunisia has been a republic since 
its independence, and although republic is not a synonym with democratic 
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practices, it meant that Tunisians were used to the idea of non-heritable power 
and expected some kind of elections (that happened not to be free and fair). 
Morocco is a monarchy, where the king still has the upper hand in the decisions 
(unlike Britain for instance where the government is determined by the citizens' 
vote). Even after having given the impression to listen to the street, the 
constitutional reform of 2011 doesn't really allow much more participation from 
the people. The king isn't responsible before anyone and can choose the most 
important ministers, and civil servants. He also controls the press and a large part 
of the country's economy (Siri 2013).  
 
Morocco: improving women’s political rights and representation in a non-
democracy 
In 2011, Morocco went through its own Arab Spring-like protests, known as the 
February 20th movement. Under pressure from street demonstrations, King 
Mohammed VI agreed to support a new constitution, in July 2011. (Hicks, 2016) 
This new constitution did not threaten the monarch’s extended powers, but it was 
progressive regarding human’s rights. Amazigh was recognized as an official 
language. Article 19 recognizes and accepts the concept of « parité » (favoring 
equal representation between men and women). Article 30 recognizes women’s 
and men’s right to vote and to be elected, and states that laws should favor equal 
access to political positions. Article 25 supports freedom of thought and 
expression. The right to peaceful assembly and demonstration is reinforced. In 
the lower chamber, there is now a 60-woman national list, compared to 30 
previously. There is also a new 30-member youth list, which together with the 
women’s list guarantees more diversity in parliament. 
 
One of the reasons that the government’s plan in favor of equality might not work 
is that it was not allocated specific funds. (Garcia Diaz, Belhdid) 
  
Morocco is a signatory of CEDAW, the first legally binding document that prevents 
discrimination against women in every field, including the political sphere. In 2011 it 
removed the reservations it had on the treaty. 
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Other laws support women’s political participation : organic law nº 29-11 relative 
to political parties (2011) forces parties to save at least a third of the important 
positions in the parties for women, at the national and regional level. It also 
imposes the creation of commission for parity in political parties.  
 
According to observers, this constitutional and legal reformed allowed Morocco 
to escape the danger of instability created by the Arab Sping, while preserving 
the power of the king, and not really boosting a movement towards democracy. 
(Brousky, 2015) The monarchy did not give up its essential prerogatives, in order 
to be able to control the Moroccan political scene just like before 2011. The 
“hegemonic control of the political process” (Maghraoui, 2011) was not 
threatened. These changes also served the monarchy, in the sense that it 
invested in women's empowerment to counter political Islam (Skalli 2011). It was 
a good way to present itself as the protector of women’s rights and a relatively 
secular government (which might seem somewhat paradoxical, since the 
powerful king is also a powerful religious authority). 
 
 
Tunisia: encouraging women’s political participation in an unstable democracy  
After the revolution, the first task assigned to the newly elected parliament was 
to write a new constitution, more in phase with people’s aspirations. Given the 
composition of the constituent assembly, with Islamist party Ennahdha, small left-
wing parties such as Al Massar, others close to the old regime, it is no wonder 
that reaching an agreement proved a difficult task.  
 
The greater involvement of Tunisian women in the constitution drafting process 
made a difference  in  the  final  gender  provisions  of  Tunisia’s  constitution, 
according to Silwa de Alvis (2017). The constitution particularly benefitted from 
the cooperation of progressive deputies favorable to women rights, having a 
formal role, and feminist activists, who organized protests and events.  
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In 2012, one of most tense moments when discussing the new constitutions 
concerned whether the text should refer to the “complementarity of men of 
women”, which feminist groups felt removed the possibility of full equality. Not 
including the expression in the constitution and referring to equalities was one of 
the main victories of feminist groups and progressive deputies. Until 2014, and 
since 1959 the constitution stated that the president could only be a Muslim man, 
born to a Tunisian father and Tunisian grandfather. (Tamzini, 2012). The new 
constitution is the first in the Arab world to give all Tunisians, women and men, 
the right to be presidential candidates.  
 
Article 46 guarantees women that they will keep their rights stemming from the 
Personal Status, including the right to divorce, to marriage by mutual consent and 
also the banning of polygamy. This Article also guarantees parity between men 
and women in all elected assemblies: it is now one of the only four countries in 
the world that have constitutionalized parity (Daoud, 2015). Article 20 guarantees 
the equality of rights and responsibilities 
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3. Recent improvement of the statistics of formal representation  
 
Improving the numbers of women’s political participation is essential, because 
women often have the greatest understanding of the deficiencies that women and 
girls face, and essential knowledge of how to advance their rights. In pushing for 
change, they develop leadership skills that they can then transfer to political 
contexts. (UN Women, 2012) 
 
2002 marks the first time Morocco implemented its parity law, which allowed 30 
women to be elected to the lower chamber of parliament on a separate list. This 
number rose with time. At the 2011 legislative elections, 60 women were elected 
on a separate, national list. Still, women only represented 17% of the members 
of the lower chamber. After the 2016 elections, women represented 21 % of the 
members of the lower chamber. According to international institutions, the rate 
from which women can start having a significant influence is about 30%, which 
Morocco does not reach. This does not respect the goal of parity stated by the 
Figure 7: Proportion of women in the lower chamber in May 2015, Le Monde Diplomatique, 2015 
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constitution in article 19. However, the progress in just over two decades is still 
noteworthy: from 1993 to 2016, the proportion of women in the lower was 
multiplied by 35, from 0.6% to 21%. 
 
Figure 8: Proportion of women in the lower chamber in Morocco over the course of the years (Garcia 
Diaz, Belhdid, 2017) 
When it comes to the Councilors’ chamber (the upper chamber), women are even 
less present: in October 2015, there only were 13 women out of 120 members, 
or 10.8 %. This is due to the fact that although lists alternate men and women, 
men are almost systematically at the top of the list and guaranteed a seat. Since 
few seats are allocated, this voting system will always favor men at the top of 
lists. 
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According to the ministry of Interior, women got 21% of the seats in the 2015 local 
elections, which represents about twice what they got in the previous 2009 
elections. 
 
Regarding the composition of political parties’ executive bureaus, all of those 
analyzed by researchers Garcia-Diaz and Beldhid were mostly trusted by men. 
Some of them had quotas to help gurantee women’s participation, like the Part 
Authenticité et Modernité (PAM), which requires its executive instances to have 
at least 45 of women, or the parti du Progrès et du Socialisme, that requires 30% 
of women among its leaders. If parties themselves do not have gender equality, 
they might be less credible when they promote women’s rights and participation. 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of female members in different Moroccan institutions, Garcia-Diaz Belhdid 2016 
 
In Tunisia, the situation has also improved in the last few years. In 2004, women 
represented 22% of all deputies elected. In the new Constituent assembly, 26.7% 
of all deputies were women, while they were 31.3% in the assembly elected in 
2014. This increase is due to the fact women have been inspired to run more, 
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and to the fact that more women were at the top of electoral lists. It allowed 
Tunisia to reach the 32nd place in terms of women’s representation in parliaments 
globally. Women are still underrepresented in government, as shown by the table 
below. 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of women in the successive Tunisian governments, Tunisian Government,2016 
It is relatively complicated to find statistics when it comes to women’s participation 
in parties, and their representation in the executive instances. (TAP 2014) Eight 
parties signed a charter in 2016 where they committed to improving “women’s 
active participation in political life”, in elections but also in their own structures. 
Among these parties were Nidaa Tounes, Ennahdha, le Parti républicain, 
Machrou' Tounes, and Al Massar. Ennahdha for instance made sure that women 
were better represented: there now are 25% of women in the party’s structures. 
However, the party still does not demand equal representation (« parity ») in its 
instances. (Boukhayatia, 2016) 
There is no representation of LGBT candidates.  According to Senda Ben Jebara, 
“the few people who are part of it are still not sufficiently trained, not invested 
enough. Suggesting homosexual candidates could potentially harm the 
reputation of a party. That said, it will be necessary to have these necessary 
training, to be present. The community in general is not very politically involved. 
According to those I know, a large part of the community does not vote, is not 
aware of what is happening politically. It's still a problem. 
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4. The singularity of the female vote 
As an introduction, it is important to underline that analyzing political participation 
is not an exact science, even when it comes to formal representation. 
In Morocco for instance, millions of people are simply not registered on the 
electoral roll. As a consequence, participation rates are much higher than they 
could be if every citizen in age and legally allowed to vote were registered. There 
is a high proportion of invalid ballots. The lack of trust in the political system does 
not contribute to giving an accurate picture of the voters’ preferences, since a lot 
of them do not vote. (Benmessaoud-Tredano, 2016) Like younger men, younger 
women are less likely to vote than the general population, while older women 
(over 65) are more likely to vote than the general population. (Afrobaromètre, 
2016). In the municipal and regional elections of 2015, women were vastly less 
likely to vote than their male counterparts: at the municipal elections only 21,18% 
of them voted, compared to 78,82% of men, while at the regional, the difference 
was slightly less striking, with 38,64 of women voting, compared to 61,36 of men. 
According to political scientist Jean-Noël Ferrié, this can be explained by two 
reasons: women are usually less educated than men, and thus are less likely to 
get involved in the political process. Second, and this reasons also applies, 
although less so, to men: people in Morocco are very “depoliticized”. Since they 
do not believe that their vote can have an impact and change anything, they do 
not even vote.  
 
In Tunisia, women represented 47% of all people registered on the electoral roll 
for the 2014. (Ministry of the Interior) 
 
Figure 11: Gender repartition for the 2014 Tunisian elections 
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Women were particularly involved in the election, and about 50% voted in the last 
presidential elections, in 2014, which is less than the national average of 63%. 
As with Morocco, the lower participation rate can be explained by lower literacy 
rates, as well as gender stereotypes according to which the place of women in is 
the home, and not the public sphere. Almost half of all polling station members 
were women. However, the power unbalance was also inferable from the fact that 
only 30% of women were president of their polling station.   
At the 2014 presidential elections, women voted in majority for Beiji Caïd Essebsi. 
An explanation would be that they were looking for more stability and the 
preservation of their rights, in an uncertain time, which is something that men are 
less preoccupied about (Zargouni, 2014).  
 
When it comes to choosing a political party, the women I interviewed explained 
that depending on their social and religious backgrounds, women would feel more 
or less comfortable in some parties. “Maybe some women with hijabs feel more 
comfortable in Ennahdha to begin with. So maybe it is not so much that a party 
would be more open to women with hijabs, but that these women would go more 
to certain parties. Ennahdha is definitely open to hijab – and non-hijab wearing 
women. They have non muhajabah [hijab-wearing woman] MPs.” (Belghith, 
2017) 
Nidaa Tounes probably would not be the first choice of hijab-wearing and 
conservative women. “In some political parties, there are members who for 
instance, in the past, always spoke against the hijab, or who used to say that the 
hijab is a symbol of oppression. Of course, if you wear a hijab, and someone who 
said that kind of things is in the executive board, that's impossible [for you to join 
the party]” (Belghith, 2017). 
 
According to Senda Ben Jebara, some women do not vote in order to improve 
the collective situation of women, but in order to support the Quran. “Because 
religion is sacred for some of them, we do not even have the right to interpret the 
text. Since the only people who interpret the texts are men, it does not give too 
many rights to women” (Ben Jebara, 2017). 
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5. Many obstacles remain and women are underrepresented 
In terms of political empowerment, Morocco was ranked 98 out of 144, and 
Tunisia 71 out of 144 in 2016. (World Economic Forum, 2016) 
 
Men and women do not have the same roles politically: there is a horizontal 
division. For instance, with list-based voting systems, there has to be gender 
parity. However, the elected representatives still follow the traditional gender roles 
that exist in the private sphere. Most of the people dealing with the family and 
social matters are women, whereas most of the deputy mayors in charge of 
finances are men. Fields that are associated with men are considered more 
valuable than those associated with women.  (Sénac, 2017) 
 
In Morocco, new laws instituting gender quotas in political parties are not 
accompanied by sanction mechanisms. It also does not prevent men from 
systematically being chief candidates when candidates are elected from a list. 
Furthermore, the political parties’ Gender equality committees are often inactive 
(NDI, 2013). In the 2017 El Othmani government, only nine ministers out of 38 
are women. The only female senior minister, Bassima Hakkaoui, leads the 
ministry for families and women. Historically, since its independence, Morocco 
has always been led by men (Kings and prime ministers). The monarch can only 
be a king. 
Despite all the new evolutions in Tunisian laws and Tunisian society, the Chahed 
government of August 2017 only had 6 female members (3 ministers and 3 under-
secretaries), which amounts to 14% of the total number of ministers. Women 
often get less prestigious and strategic ministries than men. (For instance, they 
got the ministry for Women and Children, and the undersecretary for 
transportation). Historically, since its independence, Tunisia has always been led 
by men (Presidents and prime ministers). Only one woman has been a governor. 
However, in September 2017, prime minister Chahed promised to make efforts 
to achieve gender equality.  
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Male politicians are reluctant to share power and adapt their practices 
Political scientist Réjane Sénac says that there are two major differences in the 
experiences of women and men in the political field.  
First, women have to deal with their personal as well as professional lives at the 
same time, and it is often cited as a reason why they do not get involved in politics. 
When you look at women in Parliament or cabinet ministers, they often do not 
have children or waited for them to grow up before getting into politics. Women 
with children often say they talked about their decision with their family, and thank 
their husband for helping. Men usually do not talk about this issue. 
Second, women often feel they need to earn their legitimacy and report back to 
their voters on their accomplishments. It is a social construct, because this need 
for legitimacy is less felt amongst male politicians.  
A way of obtaining more women representatives, besides parity laws, would be 
to vote and implement a law that prevents representatives to hold multiple offices 
at the same time, and also to keep the same office for a long period of time. The 
role of the political parties is essential, since they get to select the candidates. 
They also promote certain members, who after a certain time in managing roles, 
might claim their experience to run for office. Historically, most parties have 
promoted male candidates.  There might several explanations : several parties 
do not have enough female members ; others did not make the effort of 
campaigning in order to convince women to run, or because they do not think 
parity is important and that women’s place is not in politics. (Mahfoudh, 2011). 
 
Women are confronted to specific problems, that were not taken into account 
when parties were being built. When women started investing the political fields, 
parties did not change their practices, which rendered women’s political 
participation quite difficult. This is true at all levels, from municipal councils to the 
Parliament.  
 
In Morocco, women elected on the national women’s list can feel less legitimate, 
because they largely owe their success to their party. Deputy Milouda Hazeb 
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thinks women can have a hard time participating because of sexist attitudes. 
(MAP 2015) 
 
In Tunisia, women were only at the top of the electoral ballot in 16% of the cases, 
which political parties admitted was their fault. Women are active on the ground, 
but men in power have a hard time integrating them to positions of power, 
because of sexist habits. Deputy Amina Rekik, from the party Machou' Tounes 
states that women are used for political gain when election time comes, but not 
respected afterwards. (Boukhayatia, 2016) 
 
Journalist Safa Belghith agrees with this analysis: the “parity” rule encourages 
women to participat. Even if they are intimidated. “Almost all of the women I know, 
their first reaction to political activism, or running on a list, would be “no, I can’t, I 
have kids” or other reasons. And the law is really good, because it shows them 
that it is their place, their right to be there. It makes them realize that it really 
matters for them to be there. When it comes to women running, parties are doing 
quite well, but it comes to women getting the positions of power, it is not the case. 
They’re not really promoted and don’t usually get the top positions (Belghith, 
2017) 
 
 
An obstacle to women’s participation is the way parties are organized. For 
instance, women are less likely to attend political meeting late at night, since they 
are often responsible for childcare, and it could threaten their safety. In 
conservative, it also would not be necessarily approved for a woman to go out 
alone at night. In order to attract women, political parties have to change their 
practices. (Boukhayatia, 2016) 
 
 
Role of the unions is limited 
Another way of participating politically is to get involved in a labor union. Those 
are usually not very favorable to women getting positions of power in their own 
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structures.  
 
In Tunisia, the powerful Union Générale du Travail (UGTT), the biggest union in 
the country has about 50% women membership. However, there are no women 
among the 13 members of the executive board. Female members complained 
that they have been indispensable to the revolution and the changes made 
afterwards, and that they deserve to take decisions as well. (RFI, 01/2017) The 
board members decided that a quota of two women would become mandatory, 
but not before 2022, almost ensuring that theirs will remain an exclusively male 
club for at least a few more years. 
On social issues regarding women, the UGTT can be quite conservative and 
influence the decisions taken in parliament.  Its general secretary has declared 
that the equal inheritance is a "sensitive" issue which should be dealt with "wisely" 
and should not distract the country from its priorities. (Bessis 2017) 
 
In Morocco, no laws state that there should be parity in the instances of the labor 
unions. Most unions have quotas, around 20% of women at least.  The 
Confédération démocratique du travail (CDT) has created a special commission 
for women and organizes activities that target women. The Organisation 
démocratique du travail (ODT) has a quota of 25 % women in all its representative 
structures, and has trained its member to gender budgeting. The Union Générale 
des travailleurs du Maroc (UGTM) has a quota of 20% women in its instances. 
However, labor unions in Morocco have limited influence for two reasons. First, 
they are far from representative, since only 7% of Moroccan workers belong to a 
union. The union are numerous, but represent few people and often disagree: 
between themselves, among themselves, with the political parties they are close 
to. The other reason is that given the nature of the Moroccan regime, the state 
never let civil organizations have too much power. (Zaireg, 2014) Their actions 
towards gender equality and to promote better women’s representation is unlikely 
to have a deep impact on Moroccan political life.  
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A number of women feel disappointed and lack trust in the political system 
As evidence by political scientist Benmessaoud Tredano, people in Morocco do 
not usually trust their government and political institutions much. As a regime that 
is not democratic, the rule of law is not always respected, which means people 
live in uncertainty: they cannot be sure in advance of how the police is going to 
react if they protest, or whether a judge will follow the law in a trial. A large part 
of the population feels depoliticized (as evidence by the abstention rates), 
thinking that their political participation will have absolutely no impact. There is a 
sense that the country are led by the elites, and that the input of lower-class 
citizens has no value. Saida Sabir explains that she is not involved politically, 
because in her opinion, “political commitment in Morocco is reserved to a precise 
social class and a well-determined category of people” to which she does not 
belong. Paradoxically, Saida also said that she participated in protests, but since 
it was not in a formal context, she does not think it constitutes political 
participation. “Yes, I voted in the national elections and participated in 
demonstrations in solidarity with the Amazigh peoples and the Amazigh cause, 
precisely the question of expropriation by the Makhzen (Moroccan authority) in 
the South of Morocco”. (Sabir, 2017) 
 
In Tunisia, citizens who have launched a revolution are a little more confident in 
their capacity to change society through politics. Yet, again, people belonging to 
minorities, or living in the countryside are less likely to participate and to think that 
their vote matter. Senda Ben Jebara explains why, in some communities such as 
the LGBT, citizens cannot trust the political system. 
“There is also a threat to participating in political life, that it is felt particularly by 
some parts of the population. When you are active politically, you are much more 
vulnerable to attacks, people who look into your life, who will find things that you 
do not want to be discovered about you. And so there are many more precautions 
that are taken. 
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I was asked to run for municipal elections, and I refused, mainly for the work I do 
and for who I am. Socially speaking, it would completely annihilate me. There are 
a lot of things that are put at risk in this kind of participation” (Ben Jebara, 2017). 
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CHAPTER III: A PARTICULARLY ACTIVE CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN TUNISIA, UNLIKE IN MOROCCO 
One of the Tunisian revolution's characteristics is to have taken place without 
leaders. Mohsen-Finan (2013) notes that protesters fought for universal rights, 
which was enough to motivate them. As a result, no revolutionary heroes (well-
liked by the Arab left) or martyrs (promoted during Islamic revolutions) emerged, 
and it remained an egalitarian, grassroots movement. The protests, although they 
were on the whole peaceful, were very violently cracked down on by the 
government, which sensed a threat to its survival. The final estimations state that 
at least 300 protesters were killed (RFI, 2012). 
In the case of Morocco, the most famous movement is called “Mouvement du 20 
février”, in reference to the date the first protests it organized happened. It had 
no recognized leader and was influential enough that after a few months of 
growing protests the king decided to implement a constitutional reform, that 
granted more power to the people. Similarly to the Tunisian movement, it was 
violently put down by the government, to the point that several people died, 
although in much smaller proportions. 
 
1. Proliferation of new organizations in Tunisia, unlike Morocco 
Since the country’s newfound freedom in 2011, NGOs and associations have 
been multiplying in Tunisia, while Morocco has not witnessed much change. 
 
A more accessible and effective way to achieve change 
 
Even though Morocco is much less free than Tunisia when it comes to creating 
associations and NGOs, in both countries these organizations represent a kind 
of liberty that political parties cannot give. People prefer creating associations, to 
campaigning for a cause in a political party, according to Moroccan activist Saida 
Sabir.  
Even though women are a committed minority in Morocco’s associations, a study 
has shown that the associations’ executive boards only have 12% of women. 
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(Garcia-Diaz) The unbalance of power present in traditional political life can be 
found in civil society organizations as well. 
Getting involved in civil society organizations can prove dangerous. In 2014, the 
state started cracking down on a number of associations. The reason given for 
the crackdown is that they were detrimental to Morocco’s image and reputation, 
they prevented the authorities from fighting terrorism efficiently, and they worked 
for « foreign agents ». The main association targeted was the AMDH 
(Association marocaine des Droits humains): since then, over sixty activities 
organized by the association and relative to human rights have been forbidden 
(Brousky, 2015).  
 
Saida Sabir, who is the vice-president of an Amazigh association, knows that the 
state closely monitors what she and the association do. “Problems started not 
long after the first general assembly. The Moroccan authorities summoned me 
for an investigation, an investigation in which I was obliged to answer basic 
questions that the authorities could have answered directly by looking at my birth 
register or my identity card. This investigation remains a process to stress the 
members of the civil society.” This did not deter her from getting involved, but is 
has impacted her private and family life: “I also got comments from my family, 
“Will this commitment influence your professional life?” I get many comments, but 
as I said I really needed this commitment.  
 
In Tunisia, in the first years of Bourguiba’s regimes, the state was seen as an 
agent for social change. Starting in the late 1970s, youth movements became 
more structured and asked for more than what the state was giving. Two 
organizations were instrumental in the fight against the regime: the Ligue 
tunisienne des droits de l’homme (LTDH) and the Association tunisienne des 
femmes démocrates, that defended collective and individual freedoms. Following 
their examples, many civil society organizations have been emerging since 2011. 
 
~ 48 ~ 
 
Since the revolution, the situation has been safer for most activists. Civil society 
organizations have been so influential that they were included in the 2015 Nobel 
Peace prize with other Tunisian institutions. 
 
They are free to influence political life, without having to conform to all the 
constraints that political parties have. Such constraints include: creating a solid 
party, where the power is mostly top-down, a structure that needs to have a 
position and a platform on every topic, and respect specific rules and regulations. 
Rules for civil society organizations are usually looser than the ones for political 
parties. This capacity to influence the political debate was illustrated by the 
charter signed by 8 political parties to promote women’s political participation: 
civil society organizations such as SNJT or Asswat Nissa created and promoted 
it. (Boukhayatia, 2016). There is a certain weight of civil society that did not exist 
before. Civil society is now completely in the process of imposing certain rules, 
which is completely new. The progress is visible, for instance when laws change 
 (Ben Jebara, 2017). Senda adds that participating in civil society organizations 
is less risky and helps avoid internal party feuds. 
 
After the revolution, the number of the associations’ members increased by 60%. 
In feminist associations, the rise in membership was close to 100%. One of their 
goals was to oppose islamist parties, for which they mobilized women from many 
different social backgrounds. One of their victories (shared with some politicians) 
was to include gender equality in the new constitution, but also to removes all 
reservations to CEDAW, in order to be able to better protect women’s rights. 
(Mahfoudh & Delphy, 2014) 
 
 
A recent phenomenon is the development of a galaxies of international NGOs, 
that some activists such as Nadia Chaabane do not particularly appreciate. They 
professionalize the work traditionally performed by volunteers, and given their 
resources, get to decided which values are worth fighting for. (Yousfi, 2017) 
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From a social perspective, women who run organization, imagine campaigns and 
do advocacy are mostly from an educated background. The women I talked to 
had a university education. La Ligue des Electrices Tunisiennes mostly has very 
educated board members, with influential professions (doctors, judges, union 
leaders). The social prestige that comes from these positions can help legitimize 
their discourse in the rest of society. What is more, a university education helps 
women learn skills and tools that can be useful to be active politically in the civil 
society. University is also a place where networking takes place. Another element 
is that women who get involved are often from a political family and a politicized 
background (Nadia Chaabane, Safa Belghith…). 
 
 
The example of an LGBT organization: 
Homosexuality is forbidden in both countries, but LGBTQ organizations can be 
much more open about their actions in Tunisia than in Morocco. In Morocco, 
activists have to hide their activities, and can be arrested for no reason, as the 
example of MALI founder, Ibtissame Betty Lachgar shows: was arrested in 
September 2016, seen as a threat by the government.  
In Tunisia, an LGBT organization cannot really register legally, because 
homosexuality is criminalized by law. Organizations generally register under the 
umbrella term of human rights. Thanks to that, they are much freer in their work, 
and have much fewer problems with the authorities.  
 
Senda Ben Jebara explains what kind of action her association organizes: “We 
do small campaigns, in 2015 we campaigned for the abolition of article 230: we 
took pictures of a few personalities and artists holding a sign. It was launched on 
10 December on the occasion of the International Day of Human Rights. Now, 
we are preparing a series of campaigns that will soon be launched, normally 
before the end of the year. All that is advocacy, we mainly try to work from the 
internal to the external, it is very important first to strengthen the capacities of the 
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people of the community before going further. Fortunately, too, we have the 
support of civil society and a number of other human rights organizations, and it 
gives us some security to work freely. Several advocacy actions have been 
organized with the collective, in relation to this, several communiqués”. 
 
Art and culture can contribute to women’s empowerment  
According to writer Sophie Bessis, in the field of art, things have fundamentally 
changed. Women, but also the rest of the population, now express themselves in 
completely different ways than before the revolution, their speech has been freed. 
Since 2011, writing has become of form of liberation. (TAP, 04/2016) 
 
Some civil society organizations encourage artistic expression to communicate 
political ideals and ideas. In the months after the revolution, became famous for 
its revolutionary street art (Courrier international, 2014).  
 
Figure 12: Revolutionary graffiti in Tunis, photo copyright France 24, 2011 
In the LGBT organization Mawjoudin, the focus is on capacity building, commu-
nity support, psychological support, through artistic activities where people find 
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themselves. There is already a desire to expand the community before moving 
on to greater action. (Ben Jebara, 2017) 
 
2. Focus is now particularly on educating women to their rights 
and how they can participate politically 
Education is the most durable and efficient way to empower women 
Many organizations have put education at the center of their missions. Education 
is the best way to have a long-lasting impact on communities, and to autonomize 
the people who need skills and knowledge. Such a strategy was adopted by the 
organization La Ligue des Electrices tunisiennes, as seen in the documentary 
“Les Tunisiennes En Politique et Dans La Société.” (Daoud, 2015). Their main 
action is reaching out to women who might not know their rights, and teach them 
what they are allowed to do (for instance, running for political office, getting a 
divorce). LET adapts its strategy to the targeted audience: the training will be 
different if the women are from the countryside, or from dense, impoverished 
suburbs. It helps create networks of women who know and trust each other in 
local communities, through which women can learn their rights. They also monitor 
elections in polling stations, to make sure women can vote in optimal conditions. 
 
Aswaat Nissa, another Tunisian NGO, follows and supports activists in 11 political 
parties. They prepare them for the next elections, so that they can convince their 
parties to let them run. (Boukhatayia, 2016) 
 
In LGBT organization Mawjoudin, there is a focus on gender issues and sexuality. 
It is very important that people are able to recognize themselves, to accept them-
selves, to know the situation in which they live, the Tunisian context, which is very 
different from the international context. There are many problems with the ac-
ceptance of the society of these people, which is very different from what happens 
elsewhere. There have been trainings in advocacy, digital security, training on 
the ground. These trainings help members be better activists, but they also help 
them know and accept themselves, in a society where there is a lot of rejection 
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towards them. A series of trainings was called Lilo identity: Looking In, Looking 
Out. According to Senda Ben Jebara, it was a day to learn about oneself. To 
accept oneself more, to speak, to share with others the experience, to find oneself 
in a safe and secure space, where people feel at ease to share a sometimes very 
painful experience. This is considered a very important day to move from a state 
of non-acceptance to a state of acceptance. “From that point on, we can build a 
lot.” 
 
In Morocco, the Amazigh NGO Tamaynut also focuses on education and training. 
It is supported by international organizations, such as Euromed women, to do so. 
The association organizes sessions for Amazigh women, to let them know about 
their civil and political rights, and to motivate them to participate to political life. 
The association also organizes activities to train men as well, so that they too can 
promote women’s rights and women’s empowerment.  
Saida Sabir recounts her positive experience in gaining leadership in Tamaynut. 
“The participation of women is strongly demanded, given its importance. As an 
example, the election of women to the general assembly has become almost 
mandatory, to encourage women to participate. In my opinion, being a female 
vice president of Tamaynut is desirable”. Tamaynut really has a plan for gender 
equality, that results in women being encouraged to apply to be in the executive 
office and have a say when it comes to taking decisions. (Sabir, 2017) 
 
 
 
There still are limits to the actions of civil society  
First, a noted phenomenon in Tunisia has been the opportunistic creation of 
organizations. Many people got involved to advocate for women’s participation, 
and other human rights issues, because it what popular internationally and a good 
way to receive funds.  Sociologist Feriel Lalami regrets the “NGOzation” of 
feminism that imposes themes, practices, actions. It leads to a bureaucratization 
and depoliticization of the feminist movement. She wonder whether such a 
movement can survive if it loses its soul (Lalami, 2017). Former deputy and active 
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feminist Nadia Chaabane argues that human rights NGOs are perverted because 
they receive huge sums of money, often from abroad. According to her, people 
do not believe in the power of activism anymore, there is no more frame of 
reference. It is a transitional phase.  There is a weak consensus that attenuates 
the issues. Priority [in terms of funding and respectability] is given to NGOs rather 
than political parties (Chaabane, 2017) 
 
Senda Ben Jebara shares this analysis: “People all of a sudden begin to take an 
interest in LGBT rights. It had become very cool, everyone was telling us that they 
would start working with us, and are be-ginning to really take ownership of the 
cause.” She disliked this phenomenon, because as someone who works and 
belongs to a hyper-marginalized community, she does not want people from 
outside, who absolutely do not share that experience to say that they will take 
charge of things.  
 
Second, men often control most of the power, even in organizations with feminist 
goals. They are more likely to get involved and they are used to speaking publicly, 
to expressing their ideas and opinions. For instance, Tamaynut, the Amazigh 
organization in Morocco, organizes many workshops to empower and educate 
women, work with international organizations. However, members on the 
executive board are mostly men: out of 13 people, there are 4 women and 9 men. 
(Sabir, 2017) 
 
We have already discussed the dangers for civil society organizations in Morocco 
at the beginning. Since it is a rather repressive society, that might have not have 
been surprising. However, even in “liberalized” Tunisia, activists can also get 
arrested. from time to time there are arrests. Members of LGBT organization 
Mawjoudin know that some activists get arrested from time to time, generally not 
in the capital, because it is where most civil rights organizations are. “They started 
to stop people gradually. What is good is that we are aware of the arrests, so we 
are advocating, communicating, and most of the people who were arrested did 
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not stay in prison for very long. I think the person who stayed the longest in prison 
that I heard about was there for one year, while the law says it should be 3 years”.   
(Ben Jebara, 2017) 
 
There also is criticism about liberal feminist organizations, that did not take 
everyone into account when leading actions (conservative, potentially hijab-
wearing women). The younger generation tends to be more interested in 
intersectional associations, and not ones that focus solely on feminism. 
(Mahfoudh, 2015). Safa Belghith explains that “progressive organizations haven’t 
done anything for people like me. If I went to them and I said I had been 
discriminated against, I don’t think they would do anything. They are just selective 
in who they help”.  
 
 
Taking similar country as an example 
Some Moroccan activists have said that to them, Tunisia was a model to follow. 
(Castelliti, 2017). Women’s rights there are more advanced than in any other Arab 
nation. Progress was made on abortion, banning polygamy, or allowing divorce 
much before Morocco (women were only able to ask for a divorce in 2004). 
Activist Fouzia Assouli, who is the president of the Ligue démocratique des droits 
des femmes, thinks that besides copying the Tunisian model, Morocco should go 
even further. However, there are obstacles to expanding women’s rights. Tunisia 
had to overcome them, but in Morocco they are even more difficult to avoid : the 
population tends to resist progressive laws, because of cultural, ideological and 
religious reasons. (Rougani, in Castelliti, 2017). 
 
Activists recognize that progress has been made in Morocco in the last few years, 
with women becoming more aware of their rights. 
 
Tunisia could in fact act as a prototype for other countries in the region, when it 
comes to women’s rights and women’s political participation. According to Hague 
and Harrop, studying a pioneer (such as Tunisia) can help in comprehending a 
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phenomenon which is growing in significance elsewhere: women are getting 
empowered in Morocco, partly because they were inspired by what happened in 
Tunisia. 
3. Technological innovation and the internet have a 
transformational role 
The role of social media was also essential in both countries, mainly through 
blogs, Twitter and Facebook. According to Hague and Harrop, “Developments in 
communications have lowered the barriers to entry for new movements, 
facilitating their rapid emergence when ordinary politics had been deemed to fail”. 
 
Protesters could set up their meeting points and communicate their ideas much 
more freely and discreetly than in a traditional social situation, where there is 
more societal control and immediate backlash from the authorities in case of a 
speech or an action that could threaten their power.  The Facebook page of 
Mouvement du 20 février in Morocco for instance has around 70 000 fans, which 
is a lot for a country with a relatively low access to the internet.  In Tunisia, 
freedom of speech had never been greater than after a few months into the 
transitional period, which allowed civil society to express itself. 
 
In the case of women, new technologies allow them to participate more, since 
they do not have to show themselves physically, and can organize events 
remotely. Social media also allow users to reach a very high number of people 
who might be interested in a political action, and that the event creator would not 
have known personally. Safa Belghith says that she knew about the protests from 
Facebook, and that she also uses social media and online websites as her 
sources of news (Bawsala, Marsad Majles and others). Since TV channels tend 
to be very biased when they are used by authoritarian regimes, activist can look 
for more accurate news on the internet, if they can find some that are not 
censored in their country.  
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Persecuted minorities, such as members of the LGBT community, can use the 
internet to their advantage. As explained by member of Moroccan association 
Aswat, the internet is one of the only safe and secure spaces for homosexuals 
and transsexuals. (Lacroix, 2016) The internet also allows people to create 
communities. In Tunisia, Facebook was instrumental in creating solidarity 
networks. People could meet and launch events, especially since members of the 
LGBT are at risk when they are in public spaces. To counter potential 
governmental spies, LGBT and human rights organization focus on digital 
security (Ben Jebara, 2017). 
 
4. Transitional justice gives a preeminent role to women in 
Tunisia 
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), transitional 
justice refers to the ways countries emerging from periods of conflict and 
repression address large scale or systematic human rights violations so 
numerous and so serious that the normal justice system will not be able to provide 
an adequate response. This kind of justice particularly focuses on women, and 
the way they will help rebuild a society that was torn apart. A network was created 
to promote that goal: “Transitional Justice is Also for Women”. Founded in 
September 2015, the aim of the network is to ensure the participation of women 
victims in the transitional justice process. It brought together 11 women’s 
associations who could work with victims to help them understand how 
transitional justice could address their experiences of authoritarianism. 
(ICTJ, 2017) 
 
Tunisia has started a transitional justice process after it emerged of decades 
under authoritarian leaders. Thousands of people have already contributed their 
complaints, which will be treated by the Truth and Dignity Commission. Its goal 
is to denounce human rights violations, make reparations and hold the abusers 
accountable, in order to potentially attain national reconciliation. 
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After a few months, 12,000 victims made themselves knowns, most of them being 
men. Human rights activists however were surprised at the number of women 
who recalled episodes of sexual violence and rape. (Gall, 2015) Through this 
process, they might be able to get reparation, and to find a place in society, where 
victims are not ashamed anymore. That could be one of the definitions of 
empowerment. 
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CONCLUSION 
After studying women’s political participation in Morocco and Tunisia, and 
especially how it has evolved in the last few years, several elements can be 
highlighted. 
First, both societies are profoundly divided along a conservative-progressive gap, 
as well as a rural-urban one and an educational one. In some ways, political and 
economic elites are very similar to Western ones: they had comparable 
educations, speak the same language when it comes to women’s empowerment, 
and women from the elite have a genuine chance of getting powerful positions, 
such as lawyer or doctor. However, when it comes to holding actual political 
power, even women from a privileged background are much less represented 
than men from the same background as members of parliament, government 
ministers, or mayors. Rural women are less likely to get an education, and even 
less likely to go to university. This decreases their likeliness of getting politically 
involved, formally or informally, because they lack the political resources, but also 
the financial resources to do so. The only way to get broader parts of the 
population in general, and women in particular, involved in politics, is to improve 
the rural and poor population’s access to education, as well as building a better 
economic system and a social safety net. 
That said, this process has started, and more women than ever are getting 
involved thanks to better education and access to the Internet. Women’s literacy 
rates in both countries, especially Tunisia, have soared in the past few decades. 
Political participation remains complicated for a vast number of women in the 
older generations who cannot read, and therefore cannot compare written 
political platforms or inform themselves through newspapers and written news. In 
the younger generations however, a large majority of women are able to read and 
can more easily make their own judgement. They can also better navigate their 
country’s bureaucracy and are more equipped to start running for office, as they 
are more likely to understand the rules and law pertaining to that activity. Access 
to the Internet is now high in urban areas, and growing in rural parts of the 
country. This allows women to communicate with like-minded people, other 
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women involved politically that they might not have met in their first circle, and it 
allows themselves to express their opinion on the platform of their choice.  
 
In countries where corruption is relatively common and where trust in political 
representatives is low, women seem to particularly favor civil society activism. It 
is a freer space, where women do not necessarily need men’s approval to 
become active and get power – unlike in political parties for instance, where men 
generally control who is nominated. The structures of civil society organizations 
are looser, and they generally focus on narrower issues. It can help women feel 
more at ease to get involved when they know the extent of the organizations’ 
reach and fight. 
When women get involved in civil society organizations, one of their issues of 
choice seem to be improving women’s situations and rights. Indeed, given the 
discrepancy between women and men’s situations, closing the gap might look 
like the obvious first step for women who are discriminated against in several 
ways.  
In terms of what the future might look like for women’s political participation in 
both countries, Tunisia seems to be on its way to greater political equality. Both 
societies are conservative, but thanks to previous educational history and the 
revolutionary boost, women are more likely to get involved and choose their 
destiny. Morocco could only catch up by improving significantly its educational 
system and the opportunities given to young women in its society. The laws would 
have to be changed to allow more participation. The country will only attain wide 
political participation when it democratizes and reduces the level of corruption: 
women are currently discouraged because when they get involved, they have 
little agency, are risking their freedom and might see their efforts not be effective 
because of corruption. Corruption is a problem Tunisia has to tackle as well to 
have a more stable and durable democracy, which has the people’s trust. 
 
When it comes to the limits of my work, the fact that I cannot speak Arabic, 
somewhat limits my analysis of the situation. I could not interview monolingual 
Arabic speakers, therefore limiting my research to bilingual, usually wealthier, and 
~ 60 ~ 
 
more educated interviewees. I also could not read the local press in Arabic and 
the academic articles written in Arabic. Some of the Francophone media is known 
to have a more liberal slant: Huffington Post Maghreb often promotes a 
progressive agenda for instance. However, I should add the caveat that academic 
articles by Tunisian and Moroccan scholars are often written directly into French: 
they can easily reach an international audience this way. Moreover, both 
countries have several Francophone newspapers, so my understanding of the 
situation mostly came from local analyses.  
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Annex 2: Interview of Senda Ben Jebara, member of the Tuni-
sian LGBTQ organization Mawjoudin 
In this interview and the following ones, LD refers to the author. 
Senda has agreed for the interview to be recorded. 
SB: We are not specialists in political participation, we have feminist tendencies, 
but we are mainly an LGBT association. 
LD: I wanted to have different points of view, and yours will be very interesting. 
LD: Could you introduce yourself? 
SB: I am part of Mawjoudin as a social advisor at the moment, and I have also 
been a member of the board since 2015. I am 28 years old, I belong to a political 
party, the Masar youth organization, the democratic and social path. I have some 
knowledge of politics, given my political background. I grew up in Tunis, in an 
average social context, in a middle-class family. I had a state education, which is 
very important to say, and I did my high school education in a special high school, 
a "pilot" high school. There is an entrance examination, and those with the best 
grades are oriented towards this school. That said, I have not finished my univer-
sity studies. I started several things that I did not finish. 
I was very active in the political sphere, and afterwards in civil society, even more 
active, especially lately. 
LS: Could you describe your organization, and its objectives? 
SB: It is an organization that was created in 2013, as a collective of three to four 
people maximum. In 2015, we registered as “Mawjoudin-we exist”. And from 
there, it took about a year and a half to really start working on capacity building, 
advocacy, lobbying, campaigning, social and financial support, a little bit of eve-
rything. We work primarily with LGBTQI individuals, but we are an intersectional 
organization, so we also work on migration issues, refugees, feminist issues, of 
course. It is also part of the group of individual freedoms, 34 organizations in 
Tunisia that fight for individual freedoms in the country. 
LD: Was it simple to register with the authorities? 
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SB: As an LGBT organization, it's always a bit complicated, you cannot really 
register, because homosexuality is criminalized by law. What we generally do, 
what almost every other organization does, is that it is registered as an organiza-
tion that works on the issue of human rights promotion. Since our work reinforces 
human rights, it makes sense. Thanks to that, we are much freer in our work, we 
have much fewer problems with the authorities. 
LD: Could you describe your role in the organization, you said "social coun-
selor" I think? 
SB: That's right. As a social counselor, I'm not just in charge of social counseling. 
I am also listening: we have a small listening service, which provides guidance, 
we are three colleagues working there. I mainly work on collecting information 
that could be used by people later: medical information to be provided to some 
doctors, mainly mental health specialists, psychologists and psychiatrists. But 
also other aspects. 
I take care of useful contacts within other organizations. I have a lot to do with 
other organizations, whether national or international, to create contacts and a 
network that could possibly help other people. I also work a lot in the coordination 
of certain projects, I was project coordinator before that, when I was just a simple 
member. I always do a bit of coordination aside. In fact, in small organizations 
that are being built up little by little, you find yourself doing a little bit of everything. 
I also work on campaigns, I have done advocacy work. But the main title is social 
counselor for the moment.  
LD: Does the association carry out petitions, demonstrations or other ac-
tions? 
SB: Petitions, no, not really, we try not to do things that do not really work in 
Tunisia. Frankly, petitions in Tunisia never work. We may think that it will change 
the world, it is never the case. 
We do small campaigns, in 2015 we campaigned for the abolition of article 230: 
we took pictures of a few personalities and artists holding a sign. It was launched 
on 10 December on the occasion of the International Day of Human Rights. Now, 
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we are preparing a series of campaigns that will soon be launched, normally be-
fore the end of the year. All that is advocacy, we mainly try to work from the 
internal to the external, it is very important first to strengthen the capacities of the 
people of the community before going further. Fortunately, too, we have the sup-
port of civil society and a number of other human rights organizations, such as 
the group I mentioned before, and it gives us some security to work freely. More-
over, we discussed the subject of article 230 which criminalizes homosexuality 
and anal testing several times within the collective. Several advocacy actions 
have been organized with the collective, in relation to this, several communiqués, 
etc. There is also a coalition of LGBT associations in Tunisia, which is made up 
of three associations: Mawjoudin, Chouf, and Damj. We work together. 
We also made the Universal Periodic Review this year, which was sent to the UN, 
I believe there were 24 recommendations from international delegations. Which 
is enormous. Of course, it was rejected, but it's a first step, and they promised to 
review the anal test, which is already a huge step. 
Again, the focus is on capacity building, community support, psychological sup-
port, through artistic activities, not necessarily artistic, but where people find 
themselves. There is already a desire to expand the community before moving 
on to greater action. 
LD: Can you tell me a little bit more about the actions you are taking, in 
particular teaching members of the community about their rights? 
SB: We focus on training in gender issues and sexuality. It is very important that 
people are able to recognize themselves, to accept themselves, to know the sit-
uation in which they live, the Tunisian context, which is very different from the 
international context. There is a tendency to believe that we are part of this inter-
national context, whereas we live in another context. There are many problems 
with the acceptance of the society of these people, which is very different from 
what happens elsewhere. We have had training in advocacy, digital security, 
training on the ground, a little bit of everything, including what effects everyday 
life. 
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LD: You were talking about it earlier, it's about creating a space to talk about 
your own problems as a community? 
SB: Exactly. We had a series of trainings last year called Lilo identity: Looking In, 
Looking Out, and it's a day to learn about yourself. To accept oneself more, to 
speak, to share with others the experience, to find oneself in a safe and secure 
space, where people feel good, where people feel at ease to share a sometimes 
very painful experience. This is considered a very important day to move from a 
state of non-acceptance to a state of acceptance. From that point on, we can 
build a lot. 
LD: You have already begun to answer me, but would you say that you are 
involved politically? 
SB: That's clear. In any case, any social cause is a political cause.  
LD: So you vote regularly for the party you told me about (Al Masar)? 
SB: It's the only party that represents all the causes I fight for. It is a left-wing, 
social, and socialist party. 
LD: There is no other party that takes LGBT rights into account? 
SB: There were a few parties that at one point issued a statement denouncing 
practices against LGBT people. That said, I do not believe them too much. I know 
people in certain parties, and I do not trust them too much. In Al Masar, I know 
people, I know what they think, and I do not trust anyone else. It has always been 
the first party to make decisions about social issues, including sensitive issues. 
So I will always go to them. 
LD: Does this party accept, highlight, LGBT candidates? 
SB: Already, there should be a representation of LGBT candidates. There is no 
such thing in political parties, this representation is almost non-existent. And the 
few people who are part of it are still not sufficiently trained, not invested enough. 
I think that this party specifically would want to put some people forward, even 
though they are LGBT, and that it could potentially harm the reputation of a party. 
That said, it will be necessary to have these necessary training, to be present ... 
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Which is not always the case. I think the community in general is not very politi-
cally involved. According to those I know, a large part of the community does not 
vote, is not aware of what is happening politically. It's still a problem. 
LD: Is it because they think that they will not have influence by participat-
ing, or because the parties do not take into account their problems, or some 
other reason? 
SB: It's a bit of both. But it is also for fear of being put in the spotlight. Because 
when you are active politically, you are much more vulnerable to attacks, people 
who look into your life, who will find things that you do not want to be discovered 
about you. And so there are many more precautions that are taken. 
I was asked to run for municipal elections, and I refused, mainly for the work I do 
and for who I am. Socially speaking, it would completely annihilate me. There are 
a lot of things that are put at risk in this kind of participation. 
LD: So it's really complicated for you to engage in politics openly? 
SB: Exactly. 
LD: What made you want to get involved in your organization and your po-
litical party? 
SB: In the political party, I have always been an admirer of politics. It is for the 
values of this party precisely, for the people who are in it, their thinking, how they 
struggle for certain social causes. It impressed me enormously, and it seemed 
like the middle ground between politics and civil society. 
At one point, I had a lot more political ambitions than today. Now, I reassess the 
risks that could follow a much more political appearance. That's why I'm a little bit 
more inclined towards civil society than politics itself. Because I also find politics 
in my work in a sense. That also does not involve much intra-political tactics. 
Which sometimes irritates me. I am a little more involved in civil society and I 
neglect the political life in which I had started to participate. 
LD: For Mawjoudin, did you get involved because you knew people who 
were already members, for example? 
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SB: Yes, mainly. I was part of a feminist association before that, working mainly 
with lesbian, bi and trans people, only women. After a while, I was much more in 
favor of inclusiveness, to find a certain harmony between everyone. Already we 
are a very marginalized community, we should not be dividing ourselves. I am 
very aware that it is very important to have this feminist space alone where men 
do not have access. But I always look for some inclusiveness, and I was missing 
it. I joined Mawjoudin because I already knew several people in this organization 
and I loved the work that they did. I loved their vision, I saw a lot of potential. 
LD: Would you say that men and women have the same weight in the asso-
ciation, when you make decisions it's relatively balanced?  
SB: For decisions, I would say yes. On the other hand, for representativeness 
there are many more men than women. This is still the problem in LGBT associ-
ations, and I am pointing out that in hard-line feminist organizations there is a lack 
of representativeness, there is a lack of members, mobilization quite simply. It's 
true that it's not a matter of "attracting more or less", but gay men are much more 
present, take up much more space. 
LD: In public spaces, would you say that gays or lesbians are more perse-
cuted? 
SB: Maybe gay men. But there are also other factors that come into play, such 
as gender expression. If a gay man is manly enough, he goes unnoticed. If a 
woman is much more virile than she should be, she will be persecuted. And it is 
catastrophe when a man is not virile, or "not enough" virile, for society, then it is 
catastrophic. We had accidents that were quite scary. 
LD: Do you think getting involved in Mawjoubin was more of a positive ex-
perience, or it created difficulties, in your personal life, family ...? 
SB: That was positive, no doubt. In my personal, family life, I think I managed to 
impose a certain opinion, and a certain presence where I said "I do what I want, 
you have absolutely no say". It was more my imposition of the thing than anything 
else. Maybe other people would have been much more persecuted, that's for 
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sure. It must be said that thanks to my gender expression which is fairly feminine, 
people do not pay as much attention to what I do as if I had another appearance. 
LD: Since 2011 have you seen a difference in the involvement of women? 
Is it easier now to express yourself? 
SB: It's clear that it's completely different. It has nothing to do with how things 
were previously. It's something completely new. Before 2011, no one dared to 
talk, I personally had no idea what politics were before 2011. I knew a little that 
was all underground, the political parties did not have the right to exist, but the 
parties in power I had absolutely no idea how it was going in. I would say that the 
political representation of women at the time was much less present today than 
that. We still have a percentage of women I believe of 35% is still a huge repre-
sentation for the region. We have an obligation for the parliamentary elections to 
have a horizontality so we are working to have a verticality too. You could possibly 
establish a parity in the representation of women and men since we still have in 
the binary in Tunisia. There is a lot of progress that has been made since 2011. 
Civil society has really begun to do an extraordinary work on absolutely all the 
issues you can imagine. Political parties are very numerous, I do not even re-
member, but it's more than 100 political parties. Some of course do not work. I 
mean that people, at some point, started to say “why not me too?”. So yes, there 
has been a great political and social representation of women since 2011. And 
then we must also say that there is a certain weight of civil society that did not 
exist before. Civil society is now completely in the process of imposing certain 
rules, which is completely new. We really see the progress and the change of the 
law, a new legibility, we think that in the end it works rather well. 
LD: Would you say that being a lesbian since 2011 is easier or has not it 
changed? 
SB: It's much easier, that’s for sure. And even communication, meeting up. There 
are many things that have changed. Before we knew no one, nobody knew each 
other. And then, all of a sudden, everyone knows each other, there is a real com-
munity. This community is relatively, I will not say “united”, because there is a lot 
of drama within the community. But there is still a real community, when there is 
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a problem, everyone is mobilized. There is a certain solidarity, which did not exist 
before, because the community did not exist.  
LD: When political parties and human rights movements talk about LGBT 
rights, do you think they are sincere, or is it to show themselves in a good 
light, for example, to please the international community? 
SB: I think it's mostly because now there's a lot of money going to the LGBT 
community. Especially in the region. People all of a sudden begin to take an in-
terest in LGBT rights. It has become very cool, everyone is telling us that they will 
start working with us, and are beginning to really take ownership of the cause. 
And sometimes I think it's rude. Already we are hyper-marginalized, there is a 
person who is straight, who says I am at the forefront of the supporters of the 
LGBT community, who says they will take charge of things. While in fact no, we 
did not get mugged for nothing. 
LD: Is it possible for trans women to live in Tunisian society, to live their 
expression of gender for example? 
SB: Not at all. Precisely for trans people, it is much more problematic. They can-
not change gender. There is no legal access to hormones. They are constantly 
beaten, arrested all the time, mainly for prostitution. Because most trans women, 
because of the problems that result from all this, often find themselves becoming 
sex workers. It is a huge problem for trans women. For trans men there also are 
problems, but less than what trans women have to go through. 
LD: Why? 
SB: Mainly because it is less visible, because one accepts more that a woman is 
masculine a man is feminine. it is gender roles that intervene, we are in a very 
conservative society. It is difficult to accept that patriarchy is deconstructed. 
LD: I saw a documentary from the League of Tunisian Voters who said that 
in Tunisia since 2011 and even before, laws were fairly innovative and pro-
gressive in relation to women's rights, while society was more conserva-
tive, and full of gender stereotypes. What do you think? 
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SB: I think there's a lot of schizophrenia. There was not that problem in the 1960s, 
70s, we were still a fairly progressive society where women did not wear head-
scarves, often wore mini-skirts, it was completely different. And then it started to 
change, my theory is that it is because of satellite TV stations. With access to the 
Gulf ranges, there was much more influence from Muslim, Islamist channels. And 
besides, I saw people I knew and who were progressive putting on the headscarf. 
LD: Does your organization have members or contacts with women who are 
in rural areas, or is it completely urban? 
SB: For the moment, it is still very urban. It is very difficult to have access to 
women in rural areas, specifically for an LGBT organization. It's still much less 
accepted in rural areas, not even accepted because people absolutely do not 
know what it is. They are completely in denial that there are LGBT people who 
exist with us. The debate started 2 years ago when people on TV started talking 
about it. A lot of people went on air and said, "We do not have that. It does not 
exist." So there is also this problem where people are completely in denial. It still 
takes a lot of time to access people in rural areas, it takes a lot of groundwork. 
And then we should not neglect the migration of LGBT people to urban areas. It 
does not really make it possible to create a satellite in a rural area. 
LD: Do you think that, in the near or foreseeable future, there is a chance 
that section 230 will be eliminated? 
SB: I do not know at all. And for me personally the abolition of the article right 
away because the abolition of the article will open the door to further persecution 
if one does not make another article that protects LGBT individuals. One cannot 
remove the item without putting another item that protects. Because there are a 
thousand and one other items that could possibly persecute that person, a thou-
sand and one other ways and therefore it would be even more vulnerable. That 
said, now that there will be the Constitutional Court, there is going to be a debate, 
if there is an article that is written and condemns discrimination of any kind, then 
you possibly have your protection, and you have a way to abolish the article di-
rectly. 
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Afterwards, we are always a people of the South in general, and it has been dif-
ficult to return to the Constitution. There are laws which are in contradiction with 
the Constitution, but which are still applied, and which will be applied if they are 
not changed. So it will depend on the Constitutional Court and that will be in this 
constitutional court. If we have allies, normally it should solve a lot of problems, if 
we do not have allies, I would say that we are badly damn. 
LD: Would you say that women who are members or elected to other, more 
conservative, right-wing political parties are also fighting for the rights of 
women and lesbians? Whether you share a common goal, or not at all? 
I would say that on some points, yes, that's for sure. I will say, for example, that 
for the full legislation, all members including the Conservatives voted for the leg-
islation. It is a very progressive law that protects women, domestic violence, rape, 
and all that. It was really perfect. That said, I do not know if we can really talk 
about lesbians, because they are themselves in denial that it exists. With respect 
to equality in inheritance, I do not think they will support that either. Perhaps some 
will be, but others will, others, that is, most of the right women, will not. And then, 
if there are other laws that are a little too progressive for them, surely they will 
vote against them. One tends to see women who are somewhat the enemy of the 
woman. Because it is religion and it is sacred for some of them, we do not even 
have the right to interpret the text. Since the only people who interpret the texts 
are men, it does not give too many rights to women.  
LD: In your opinion, can Tunisia serve as an example, an inspiration in the 
MENA region? In Morocco for instance? 
SB: I do not like to see a state or government as a model. Morocco will change if 
they want to change, Moroccan feminists need to fight for it. And they will get 
there. It is a rather more conservative country than Tunisia. But I think there really 
is a huge feminist movement, especially young feminists, they do a wonderful job 
in Morocco. With all the mobilizations. And especially with violations of women's 
rights, and collective rapes. I follow a little what is going on there, and there is 
really more mobilization than three or four years ago. People really take to the 
streets, they want to make a difference. And in the end it will work thanks to that. 
~ 84 ~ 
 
I do not think that the example should be Tunisia, but it can give them some hope 
that a country in the same region has made a difference. And that might perhaps 
boost their work a bit, but I find that the word “example” is a bit problematic. 
LD: What kind of relationship do you have with the authorities, have you or 
anybody else in your neighborhood been arrested? 
SB: Yes, from time to time there are arrests. Because of article 230, mainly, but 
I do not think there are a lot of arrests in the capital. They know that all organiza-
tions are concentrated in the capital, so they try not to do arrest us here. But they 
do it in other regions, there have been several arrests, mostly after 2015. It was 
from that moment that we started to think it was getting complicated. They started 
to stop people gradually. What is good is that we are aware of the arrests, so we 
are advocating, communicating, and most of the people who were arrested did 
not stay in prison for very long. I think the person who stayed the longest in prison 
that I heard about was there for one year. While the law says it should be 3 years. 
But otherwise we had people who stayed a month, 3 months, maximum 3 months. 
LD: Can you tell me a little bit about social networks, is it particularly 
convenient to communicate when you cannot show yourself in public, for 
example? 
SB: Exactly. Just to build a community, we need a certain network. Especially in 
Tunisia, Facebook has contributed to the construction of this solidarity. There are 
groups for the other organizations, or outside of them, where everyone can 
discuss important or mundane things. Also when you start to launch training 
events for example through social networks. So yes it was enormously beneficial. 
And especially every time there is a campaign, it only works on social networks. 
Because we cannot go outside. You cannot risk it. Everything happens there and 
it works much better than if we went outside. This is the century of technology, 
and we had to do with it. 
 
LD: And in terms of security, are not you afraid of being spied on by the 
state? 
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SB: Legally the state has no right to spy. We have the right to computer security, 
so legally, if the state is spying on us, we can file a complaint. And as I said earlier, 
we do a lot of training in digital security, we take our precautions, just in case. It 
can always happen, you never know. Most sensitive data is really very secure. 
And we collaborate with other organizations like Access Now, that takes care of 
our digital security, and that is a great help.  
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Annex 3: Interview with Safa Belghith, 5th September 2017 
 
Safa Belghith works as a journalist and research consultant on issues related to 
Tunisian politics, women’s rights and media reform. 
Safa agreed to have the skype conversation recorded. The interview was 
conducted in English. 
LD: Could you introduce yourself? (Your name, where you are from, your 
education, your job...) 
Safa Belghith, 28 years old Tunisian. Originally from a city in the North, Nabeul. 
I studied English at Manouba university and then I studied English linguistics, and 
then international relations, also in English. And for now, I work as a freelancer, I 
do consecutive interpretation, conferences and meetings, I also do consultancy, 
research assistant for projects. I also co-organize the Tunis Exchange 
Programme: we bring academics who are interested in Tunisia or in Tunisian 
affairs to Tunisia, we do an intense 7-day program during which we meet 
politicians, civil society activists and so on. 
 I would say my parents are lower middle class. They are conservative. Originally 
in the islamic tendency movement, before it became Ennahdha, in the 1970s. But 
then, they left, for no specific reason. They had kids, and that’s the kind of thing 
that happens. 
LD: Would you say you are politically involved? 
SaBe: Erm... So, right after the revolution, I went to the headquarters of 
Ennahdha in my city. Because growing up in a family like mine, you will be 
politically aware. Because my mum also wears the hijab, so it’s the same 
oppression. And my dad goes to prayer, and he would be arrested sometimes. 
So the things I have been through a little bit, they have already been through. 
And you know all these things beforehand. You know Ben Ali is bad since a young 
age, you know that the regime is bad, but you also know that you should keep 
your mouth shut. So I kew what Ennahdha was. So right after the revolution, the 
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minute they opened an office here, since I didn’t know any other party here, and 
I wanted to be politically active so badly, so I went straight to the Ennahdha office. 
And I was active there, for I think a year and a half or so. I was in the youth 
committee, and the women committee. At some point I was in the Comité de 
formation. We did study sessions and things like that. But then I left, because 
there were policies I didn’t agree with. 
LD: Could you tell me a little bit about more about that? 
SaBe: So what’s happening in Ennahdha right now, with the Economic 
reconciliation Law, and the way they handled the former regime, the path they 
have chosen... I left when the early signs of that policy started. When I realized, 
I mean, I still respect Ennahdha and everyone in it, but they are not as 
revolutionary as I wanted them to be. Maybe it’s just me. You know, I went there 
with really high hopes, maybe they would never have met my hopes anyway. I 
realized that, no matter the political party, it’s not me. 
LD: So now, you don’t identify with a specific party, you don’t prefer one or 
another? 
SaBe: No, absolutely not. I’m really lost, I don’t know who to vote for. I mean, 
there are people I respect in the different parties, but that's it. 
LD: Would you say you’re an active voter, do you vote every time? 
SaBe: Yes. 
LD: Do you still vote for Ennahdha, or does it depend? 
SaBe: The next elections are in two years. So if they change their policies, 
maybe. But I don’t see it happening. For now, I’m completely at a loss. 
LD: Do you participate in other ways? Have you been to protests, signed 
petitions or other things like that? 
SaBe: Yes. Mainly the Maniche Msemah (“I won’t forgive”) protests, against the 
Economic reconciliation law. Now it’s the Reconciliation law, they removed the 
economic stuff.  And protests in the past, things that come up in certain contexts, 
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like the protest against Sissi coming to Tunisia for example. I’m not in an 
organized campaign or anything. 
LD: How do you know about these protests? 
SaBe: Facebook, obviously. But also, I know a lot of people, who are involved. 
So if there is something happening, I would definitely know about it. I follow 
Tunisian politics pretty closely, at all times. 
LD: Would you say you identify as a feminist? 
SaBe: Yes. Some people don’t like that, but I do. 
LD: Do you think that all parties defend human rights, or only some of them, 
or just for show? 
SaBe: It’s really problematic. We’re definitely doing much better than other 
countries, but also defending women’s rights is very politicized. So lots of parties 
will play on that, even Nidaa Tounes right now. I think some parties genuinely 
actually care about women. This will sound ironic and contradictory, but from my 
time in Ennahdha, even though they came out against equal inheritance, and the 
marrying non-Muslims [for Muslim women] initiatives, when it comes to on the 
ground activism, Ennahdha really do care about putting women in leadership 
positions. I’ve never had a problem, I was there for a year and a half, and I was 
actually really encouraged: as a young person, and as a woman, to take 
responsibility, and leadership. I think they really do care. I’m really disappointed 
about the Equal inheritance thing, but for almost every other issue, they manage 
well. All of their women don’t have the problems you think they would have in a 
conservative party. Ennahdha MPs are out all the time, don’t face stuff like “why 
aren’t you home to take care of your kids?”. They actually have their freedom, 
and are actually empowered within the party, which is really cool. My only 
experience is there, in this party, so I don’t how it is in other parties. 
In the Democratic Current party (“Courant Démocrate”), Samia Abbou, who is an 
MP, is one of the most vocal voices in Tunisia. She’s really tough, strong. And 
her party, for now, has stood for women’s rights. 
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Nidaa Tounes... I mean, they say things, they have versions of women’s rights. 
Maybe they do care about women’s rights, but it’s only some women. Not 
everyone. 
LD: Would you say some parties are more open to women with hijabs? For 
instance, is Ennahdha more open to them than other parties? 
SaBe: Maybe some women with hijabs feel more comfortable in Ennahdha to 
begin with. So maybe it is not so much that a party would be more open to women 
with hijabs, but that these women would go more to certain parties. Because they 
automatically assume that it is the party where they want to be. Ennahdha is 
definitely open to hijab – and non-hijab wearing women. They have non 
muhajabah [hijab-wearing woman] MPs. 
Nidaa Tounes: I don’t think they wouldn’t be open, but it’s just that these women 
wouldn’t go spontaneously there. Maybe not. I don’t think that the party would say 
no. Actually, it would be good politically. Same for Ennahdha with non-hijab 
wearing women. 
LD: Is it all political games? 
SaBe: Not necessarily. I had girls with me who didn’t wear a hijab when I was in 
the women’s committee in Ennahdha. And there were no problems at all, it was 
fine. I don’t think they felt disenfranchised or different in any way. This is all from 
my humble experience, I don’t know about other parties. 
LD: Are there spaces where hijab-wearing women can express themselves, 
inside and outside political parties? 
SaBe: For parties, yes. I don’t think that a party would actually dare to make a 
woman uncomfortable because of certain things, at this point. But in some 
political parties, there are members who for instance, in the past, always spoke 
against the hijab, or who used to say that the hijab is a symbol of oppression. Of 
course, if you wear a hijab, and someone who said that kind of things is in the 
executive board, that's impossible [for you to join the party]. 
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When it comes to other spaces than political parties, I don’t really think there are 
many. When it comes to organizations, national and international, there usually 
are both muhajabah and non-muhajabah. 
LD: In the political world, would you say comments about how women 
dress come mostly from men, or women as well? 
SaBe: Honestly, women can be their own enemy. Or the enemy of other women. 
It’s not just men. Of course, it starts with them, with people like Béji Caïd Essebsi 
or others. But women can work hard to keep things the way they are. I when it 
comes to the issue of inheritance, or the one about marrying non-Muslims, some 
women are so passionate against it. It beats me! It’s more than just men. Some 
women I’ve spoken to are more passionate than men about those two issues and 
keeping the status quo. And also, these women are those who will raise men, at 
least in Tunisia, and actually in many places. The women will raise the men with 
certain ideas, and the men will reproduce what they’ve been told. It’s a circle. 
LD: When you vote, would say you vote according to certain values? What 
would these values be? 
SaBe: In the past, I voted for revolutionary values...dignity, freedom for 
everyone...But now, it will have to change. We are past that phase. Now it’s going 
to have to be the party that has the platform that is going to save the country, 
somehow. Economically speaking, it’s not going so well. So, definitely, the 
economic agenda is a priority, and also freedoms as well. It means that if I go to 
a party, I have to make sure that this party will protect everyone, not just me. 
Because we’ve had enough. 
LD: How do you keep informed about the news? 
I read the news, I don’t watch TV, I don’t watch Tunisian channels, they are awful. 
The media is often a counter-revolutionary factor. I don’t count on TV for any kind 
of news. I don’t have a TV actually. Social media, sure. Friends, also. I actually 
know lots of politicians, because of the work I do. I do translation, mainly for 
academics who are doing research here. So it’s always with MPs and people like 
that. I’m friends with MPs from almost every party.  Which is nice, because I can 
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hear from all the points of view. I also follow the Parliament sessions sometimes.  
I would say social media (Twitter, facebook) are my main source of news. 
Bawsala, Marsad Majles and websites like that. 
LD: When you were involved in Ennahdha, would you say there were 
advantages, drawbacks for you? For instance, did you get comments from 
people around you? 
SaBe: Yes. Well, I don’t think it would happen now, but because of the time 
period. This was in 2011. When Ennahdha had been called terrorist for the past 
twenty years or more. I heard the word “terrorist” from friends actually...to my 
face. It was a really tense period, everyone was on edge. Everyone, including 
me, was so emotional, and understandably. Everyone was so defensive, on their 
guard. You have some people who were scared of Ennahdha, because they 
believed Ennahdha was going to bring this Islamic project to Tunisia. Because of 
everything that had been in the media for the past two decades. So people were 
actually scared. And Ennahdha was trying so hard to be accepted. They accepted 
a lot of mean comments from other people. They would call them names, be very 
insulting. But Ennahdha wanted to be accepted, and change the view people 
have. The logo of Ennahdha at the time was “Don’t hear about us, hear from us”. 
They really took it viscerally, they worked so hard. 
So, it was difficult. I wouldn’t say it was a bad experience, it was actually very 
good. 
LD: Were you able to convince your friends that you and Ennahdha were 
not terrorists? 
SaBe: Some people can be convinced, but there were others who, for obvious 
reasons, really believed that their lifestyles would be threatened. They believed 
that Ennahdha was going to bring back polygamy, ban alcohol. These things were 
actually never on Ennahdha’s agenda. 
During the electoral campaign, Ennahdha was saying: “these are our flyers, 
platform. We don’t want to prohibit alcohol”. But it was hard for some people to 
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believe them. And you know, there are not many good examples of Islamic 
movements in the world, where they don’t turn into oppressive regimes.   
It was difficult for people to remove this image of Iran, Afghanistan... That’s what 
they called us at that time, “you’re going to make this country into another 
Afghanistan”... It took people time to actually realize that it wasn’t the case. And 
now, six years on, people are realizing that Ennahdha isn’t planning to do all that. 
LD: Would you say that they are more institutionalized, accepted now? 
SaBe: Yes, I would say “mainstreamed”. I don’t hear people say the same things 
they used to. With this whole Nidaa Tounes coalition. People don’t see them as 
that much of a threat, they’re not the terrorists that the former regime made them 
out to be. But those first two years... were not easy. 
LD: Coming back to the hijab issue, would you say you are free to do 
whatever you want in public spaces, walk wherever you want? 
SaBe: In public spaces, people don’t stare. From society in general, there’s no 
problem, the problems come from institutions. And it depends on the people in 
these institutions. I went to two high schools. One of them is the one I talk about 
in the article, it is really willing to implement the policies. The principal would 
remove the hijab from the girls with his own hands! But the principal at the other 
high school would meet us at the entrance, and he would say “please take it off 
here”. And he pointed to a café across the street, and said “See these three men 
there? They are part of the secret police. At the end of the day, they will say ‘you 
let three hijabas walk through the gates’”. So he asked us to let him keep his job 
basically.  
Otherwise, no problems in the streets. Academia is a problem because of who 
the people in charge are. The big professors are mostly not pro-hijab. In my 
specific program, in international relations, all of them were former or current 
diplomats. Representatives of the Tunisian state abroad. We all know who got 
those jobs before the end of Ben Ali’s regime, before the revolution. Not people 
from the opposition obviously, but people from the regime. Of course their 
positions would be like that.  
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I was discriminated against in a hotel. But that hasn’t happened to me in bars, or 
nightclubs. But some of my friends were denied entry in certain bars because 
they were wearing a hijab. The thing is, you can’t complain about this. Because 
if a girl who wears a hijab goes back home and says “Oh Dad, I wasn’t let into 
this bar because of my hijab…” It doesn’t really make sense. Society wouldn’t 
understand.  
But I don’t think generally that socially, wearing a hijab is problematic. 
LD: In your article, you said that you were literally told that you would be 
discriminated against if you took a competitive exam for a civil servant 
position? 
SaBe: Yes. To be honest, I wasn’t planning to take the diplomatic exam anyway. 
But to have someone tell you that point blank, that was really shocking. All of 
these policies are not a surprise. I have been denied so many scholarships 
because of the hijab in the past. It is something I am used to. This professor really 
hated the hijab for some reason. He said, “you know, even if you succeed in the 
written exam, you will be failed at the oral exam. I am on the jury, and I will make 
sure that you don’t pass. Because you don’t represent Tunisian women.” Which 
is absurd, because so many of us wear hijabs now, but he wanted to make a 
division between women. They play on these divisions. That same teacher said 
we probably thought our classmates were sinners because they were not wearing 
hijabs. He said that between two equal candidates, he would favor the one who 
didn’t wear a hijab, because he knew she shared his ideological beliefs.  And he 
also thought that in order to work in international NGOs, it was necessary to 
remove the hijab, because foreigners were not used to it.  
LD: Do you think you could have complained to the university about what 
happened? 
SaBe: We did complain to the head of the department at some point, and I think 
it partially worked. Not because she cared, but because she said he wasn’t being 
serious, he wouldn’t do it. And he actually didn’t do it.  
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And complaining to other people, for instance at the ministry level, wouldn’t have 
worked. Because the people working there mostly haven’t changed since the 
revolution.  
And also, a lot of people don’t realize that it’s a problem. A number of my friends 
think that now everything is OK, we all have the same rights. Wearing the hijab 
is legal now, so it shouldn’t be a problem.  
LD: Do you think feminist, progressive movements forgot women like you, 
or do you feel included? 
SaBe:  In terms of progressive movements, the one that comes to mind is 
l’Association tunisienne des femmes démocrates. I respect what they are doing 
right now, but they didn’t do anything for people like me in the past. When the 
crackdowns on opponents happened, you had thousands of women whose 
husbands were in jail, who were fired from their jobs because of the hijab, just 
because of the hijab. They had no income. They would go to the offices of the 
Association, and were told that the office wasn’t there, or were just not helped. If 
anything, Femmes Démocrates actually sent a letter to Ben Ali, denouncing his 
violence in fighting the women who wear hijabs. But they didn’t denounce the 
fight against the hijab itself. They were saying something like, we agree that this 
phenomenon should be stopped, but this (the violence) isn’t the right way.  
But anyway, these progressive organizations haven’t done anything for people 
like me. If I went to them and I said I had been discriminated against, I don’t think 
they would do anything. But there also are women that I admire a lot in some of 
the organizations, that are doing amazing work when it comes to fighting for the 
violence against women law. It is a real achievement, and they have really 
pushed for it to be passed. They also stood by the women whose husbands were 
in trouble during the mine protests in 2008. They are just selective in who they 
help.  
LD: Do you believe that women who live in the South of the country, in the 
rural areas, have been forgotten? 
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SaBe: The South in general has been forgotten. Development-wise, the south 
has always been forgotten, by all the regimes including the current one. The 
presidents are always from the coast. I think it’s a general problem, not just 
women. Women from the South are forgotten. But I can’t speak from experience, 
I come from a privileged city, because it is close to Hammamet and other tourist 
attractions.  
LD: Would you say that since 2011, you’ve seen more women (including 
yourself) participate in political life, getting involved? 
SaBe: Absolutely! More people in general, but for sure more women. And we 
have the “parity” rule, it pushes them. Even if they are intimidated. Which is why 
it is a good law, because almost all of the women I know, their first reaction to 
political activism, or running on a list, would be “no, I can’t, I have kids” or other 
reasons. And the law is really good, because it shows them that it is their place, 
their right to be there. It makes them realize that it really matters for them to be 
there. When it comes to women running, parties are doing quite well, but it comes 
to women getting the positions of power, it is not the case. They’re not really 
promoted and don’t usually get the top positions.  
LD: Would you consider running for office some day? 
SaBe: I was actually asked to run for the municipal election! But I said no. Right 
now, I’m so angry at all the parties, and so disappointed politically speaking. 
Maybe one day, it’s definitely not my agenda right now. I’d right do it from the civil 
society, I’d rather work in NGOs, work on policies and things like that, but not as 
a politician, especially not as a politician in a political party. I do not like what that 
entails. Even if it is a party that I like, that I agree with on 98% of the issues, there 
will always be those 2%. I would not be myself if I had to defend those 2%.    
LD: Would you say that Tunisia can be considered an example for North 
Africa, for Morocco, could it be an inspiration for them? 
SaBe: Of course, Tunisia is an example, in the region and in the Middle-East, 
yes, definitely. Saudi Arabia is…a bit different from us for instance, polygamy is 
still accepted in a number of countries… Tunisia has always been a leader when 
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it comes to women’s rights. But it has to be analyzed in a nuanced, critical way. 
To see the problems as well. And to see through the intentions of people who are 
trying to change things. Politicians have their agendas. If these two laws (the 
marrying a non-Muslim and the equal inheritance laws) pass, it would be 
revolutionary for the region. Marrying non-Muslims is unheard of. It happens, 
people do it, but people convert only nominally. People go through the 
bureaucratic process, sign documents, read the shahada, but don’t really convert 
in their heart. So people are already marrying non-Muslims, it’s not like the decree 
prohibiting it are actually preventing it from happening. It creates a context of 
hypocrisy and lies. Fake statistics probably. The equal inheritance, I’m not sure it 
will pass. Most people in parliament are against it. Ennahdha are in a tough 
position, because if they come out against the change, to the outside world they 
will seem anti-women. But if they accepted it, they would lose a large part of their 
base. Tunisian society as a whole is quite conservative, and particularly 
Ennahdha voters. The main MPs for Ennahdha were very clear that they wouldn’t 
support the change, not the time to challenge the traditions.  
LD: Doesn’t it contradict the constitution, that says that men and women 
are equal? 
SaBe: It contradicts so many things! Even the marrying non-Muslims contradicts 
the constitution, because you should have freedom of conscience. That decree 
bothers me so much, because there are atheists in Tunisia. Does this decree 
apply to them?  
LD: I watched a documentary by La Ligue des Electrices tunisiennes, where 
they said that Tunisian society was quite conservative, but laws usually 
were ahead of their time. What do you think? 
SaBe: True. When it comes to laws, Tunisia has always been ahead of society. 
Which is why these two laws in my opinion really should be implemented. It will 
bring society up to speed. It will give protection to people. For instance, families 
can put an end to a woman marrying a non-Muslim. If the law changes, the 
woman will still have problems because of her family and of society, but she 
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would have law on her side. And it would get normalized with time, people would 
get used to it after 10 or 20 years. Laws definitely should be ahead of society.  
LD: Do you think Tunisia is headed in the right direction? Do you think you 
will continue to get more freedom with time?  
SaBe: Women’s rights, yes. We are progressing, but we really need to focus on 
real problems and not just issues that help people get elected. Beji is playing a 
political game. He’s been in politics for decades and knows exactly what he is 
doing. I don’t believe for a second that he cares whether women will have equal 
inheritance or not. It is really political.  
But we are not progressing with how things are going on the ground, for instance 
the way women are treated. Equal pay in the private sector, women in agriculture, 
young girls who become maids… which is illegal, of course, but it still happens. 
They are nine or ten years old, work, and then send the money back to their 
parents. They are not getting an education. But all this isn’t on anyone’s agenda. 
Absolutely no one talks about it. People are going crazy over those two laws, but 
a lot of Tunisian women don’t receive an inheritance…at all. In so many families, 
the brother doesn’t even get double what his sister gets, but ten times! But now, 
suddenly, everyone is for women’s rights. Politicians and civil society really need 
to look where the real issues are. 
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Annex 4: Interview of Saida Sabir, Vice-president of Tamaynut-
Rabat 
 
LD: Can you introduce yourself ? Where do you live / where do you come 
from, your age, your studies… 
I am an Amazigh woman, I live in Rabat but I am originally from the region of 
Tafraout, a small city in the South of Morocco. I am 24 years old, I studied finance 
and management at University Mohamed V in Rabat. I am currently working in 
an Italian multinational company in the finance department. 
 
LD: Can you describe your association? What are its objectives, what kind 
of membership does it have (majority of men or women, origins, social 
level) What kind of actions does the association do? 
Our association is a federal organization whose main objective is to defend the 
human rights and the rights of the indigenous peoples, the integration of the 
Amazigh language and culture, to contribute to the fight against all kinds of 
racism, and discrimination against women (applying the gender approach). 
 
The members of the association are mostly men. For example, on our executive 
board, there are 13 people including 4 women and 9 men. The absolute majority 
of our members are from the South of Morocco with some members of the Rif 
(East of Morocco), everyone can speak the Amazigh language. The members 
are from different social classes (professors, lawyers, employees, traders and 
students). 
 
The association carries out several actions, conferences on topical subjects (the 
constitution of the Amazigh language, women's equality, the environment and the 
degradation of the argan tree ...) participation in national and international events 
around subjects of indigenous peoples, workshops to learn the Amazigh 
language 
 
LD: Would you say you are engaged politically? 
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No, I am not engaged politically. In my opinion, political commitment in Morocco 
is reserved to a precise social class and a well-determined category of people. 
 
LD: Do you participate in other ways? For example, do you vote? (national, 
local elections ...) Or have you already participated in events? 
Yes, I voted in the national elections and participated in demonstrations in 
solidarity with the Amazigh peoples and the Amazigh cause, precisely the 
question of expropriation by the Makhzen (Moroccan authority) in the South of 
Morocco. 
 
LD: What made you want to go into Tamaynut? Your family, your friends,  
things you read, your studies... 
The commitment to Tamaynut at the beginning is a proposal from friends who are 
already engaged in other association. What is more, I felt I needed this kind of 
engagement, knowing the situation of the Amazighs in Morocco. 
 
LD: What is it like for women in Tamaynut? Do you think members would 
treat you differently if you were a male vice-president? 
In Tamaynut the participation of women is strongly demanded given its 
importance. As an example, the election of women to the general assembly has 
become almost mandatory to encourage women to participate. In my opinion I 
believe that being a woman vice president in Tamaynut is desirable. 
 
LD: I saw that Tamaynut had a plan for gender equality, can you tell us a bit 
more about it? 
Tamaynut really has a plan for gender equality, that results in women being 
encouraged to apply to be in the executive office and have a say when it comes 
to taking decisions. 
 
LD: Do Amazigh women particularly have difficulties to participate in the 
political life? In your opinion, why? Do you think there is a difference 
between Amazigh women and other Moroccan women on this issue? 
~ 100 ~ 
 
 
The participation of Amazigh women in political life or in social life is strongly 
linked to a consciousness that their participation will make a change, this 
awareness stems from studies and events. Amazigh women, especially in the 
South of Morocco, have difficulties getting access to education. The level of drop-
outs is very high in the region of South Morocco. Given the number of schools 
available, the level of education and other causes, the participation of Amazigh 
women is still very weak. It is logical, because of all the obstacles that I have just 
explained. There are some exceptions, like the example of Fatima Tabaamrant, 
the parliamentarian who spoke in Amazigh in parliament: it was a first in Morocco. 
Regarding the issue of the difference between Amazigh women and other 
Moroccan women I see that there is an exclusion of Amazigh women in some 
cases, but it does not mean that there is a difference between Amazigh women 
and women other. 
 
LD: Have you seen a difference since 2011 and the Arab Spring in people's 
political commitment? For example, did the women around you decide to 
engage more? Did the Tunisian case inspire you? 
As I have already mentioned politics in Morocco is still a taboo for people. In 2011 
in Morocco, the Amazigh language was included as official language in the 
constitution. People preferred to created associations to campaign for a cause or 
place to try to be involved politically, and women are a committed minority. 
 
LD: Would you say that you engage in Tamaynut has been a rather positive 
experience? Did it create any difficulties? For example, did your family or 
others comment? Or people with authority, as representatives of the 
Moroccan State? 
My experience in Tamaynut is still fresh view as I was elected vice president in 
April 2017. I think it is going well, and it will be a positive experience that will 
change my opinion on concrete things. Problems started not long after the first 
general assembly. The Moroccan authorities summoned me for an investigation, 
an investigation in which I was obliged to answer basic questions that the 
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authorities could have answered directly by looking at my birth register or my 
identity card. This investigation remains a process to stress the members of the 
civil society. I also got comments from my family, “Will this commitment influence 
your professional life?” I get many comments, but as I said I really needed this 
commitment. 
 
LD: How is it seen to speak tamazight in public, for example in Rabat? Has 
that curbed your professional career? 
I am an Amazigh woman, my two parents are Amazigh, I was born in Rabat and 
I spent all my life in Rabat but I am still attached to the Amazigh culture and 
traditions, I learned to speak Amazigh through to my parents. Speaking 
Tamazight in public was never accepted by Arabic speakers, but we always try to 
impose our language. As an example, in the 1980s and 1990s, speaking in 
Amazigh in public was strongly rejected, especially in the cities of Rabat and 
Casablanca. When it comes to my professional career, being an Amazigh woman 
is a skill that will favor me in the eyes of a recruiter, because the Amazigh are well 
known for being serious and committed to their work. 
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